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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the extent to which Public versus Private Competition has been integrated
into the Naval Aviation Depots and evaluates the effectiveness of that implementation. This study
describes the initial implementation of Public versus Private competition and analyzes early program
results based on General Accounting Office Reports, internal Navy Audits, and Special Procurement
Management Reviews. Following this background analysis, the study focuses on more recent evaluations
of the competition program from a variety of industry and Government perspectives. While industry
views tend to be somewhat homogenous concerning competition, Government perspectives vary
considerably between the Services. These differing views and philosophies regarding the extent to which
competition should exist and how that competition should be- managed suggests that there is a need for
a Department of Defense wide policy regarding Public versus Private competition. The Navy and the
Naval Air Systems Command, in particular, support such a policy which would allow the Services to
determine their "core" workload requirements for retention in their depot maintenance facilities while
shifting all other work to private industry. This policy as well as other Services' policies are evaluated
against such criteria as industrial base considerations, budgetary constraints, and political reality. The
study concludes that a Department of Defense policy which embraces the Naval Aviation Depot Industrial
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The purpose of this Thesis is to investigate the
implementation of public versus private competition within the
Naval Aviation Depots (NADEPs) and to identify future
strategies for achieving maximum effectiveness. Public versus
private competition is a relatively new form of competition
wherein public or Government activities compete against
private industry for Government contracts. Specifically, this
Thesis will trace the development and implementation of public
versus private competition as it is applied to Naval aviation
depot level maintenance. Secondly, it will evaluate the
program's effectiveness from two differing viewpoints; that of
industry and that of the Government. Thirdly, the Thesis will
analyze efforts to improve public versus private competition
and compare two major competition programs to ascertain the
level of implementation success. Lastly, the Thesis will
provide conclusions and recommendations for improving the
conduct of public versus private competitions.
The first chapter will introduce public versus private
competition as it applies it to Naval aviation maintenance.
It will also lay the groundwork for the organization and
objectives of the remaining chapters. Additionally, this
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chapter will describe the overall scope and limitations of the
study and state key assumptions on which the research is
based.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The Thesis is modeled around a primary research question
and five subsidiary research questions. They are listed
below:
1. Primary Research Question
To what extent has public versus private competition
within the Naval Aviation Depots (NADEPs) been effective and
what future strategies should be employed to achieve greater
effectiveness?
2. Subsidiary Research Questions
1. What is the definition and purpose of public versus
private competition?
2. How has public versus private competition been
applied to the NADEPs?
3. Have the public versus private competitions met the
goals of the program's original intent or purpose?
4. What impediments exist to full and effective
implementation of public versus private competition?
5. What future strategies should be employed to
enhance program effectiveness?
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The answers to these questions are contained in the remaining
chapters and draw from literature reviews, personal interviews
with both decision makers and the implementers, and the
personal knowledge and experience of the researcher. They
will also be summarized in the conclusion.
C. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE COMPETITION WITHIN THE NADEPS
The Naval Aviation Depots (NADEPs) are Government owned
and operated industrial facilities tasked to perform depot
level maintenance of aircraft, aircraft engines, and related
support and ancillary equipment. This maintenance includes
scheduled or periodic inspections and repairs, overhauls,
modifications, and unscheduled major repairs. The NADEPs also
serve as "Cognizant Field Activities" (CFAs) providing
technical and logistical support for aircraft systems end
users, i.e., the aircraft squadron. CFAs are also responsbile
for configuration control, engineering support, planning and
estimating services for aircraft requiring on-site repair, and
a number of other maintenance related services. Their
services have made the NADEPs an indispensable part of the
Naval Aviation Maintenance triad consisting of the
organizational level activity, the intermediate level,
providing indepth component maintenance and the depot level
providing all other maintenance services. The organizational
level is responsible for flightline maintenance both deployed
and at home bases and consists primarily of component removal
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and replacement. The intermediate level also deploys in
support of the squadron and conducts repairs on assemblies and
subassemblies removed from squadron aircraft. The depot level
maintains full repair capability on a number of systems, many
requiring sophisticated and expensive test equipment. [Ref.
1]
In 1987 the Navy was directed to extend a relatively new
concept called public versus private competition from ship
overhauls to aircraft overhauls. [Ref. 2] The Navy's limited
experience with this form of competition in ship overhauls
demonstrated that considerable cost savings resulLing from a
desire to improve efficiency could occur when Government owned
depots had to compete with their private (commercial)
counterparts. [Ref. 3] Initially, four aircraft programs were
selected for competition. The actual results and reported
cost savings of the aircraft programs varied
considerably.[Ref. 3] LiKewise, the fairness of the
competition and the administration of the awards were
challenged by both representatives of the Navy and industry.
Government audits and reports suggested that greater savings
could have been gained through more effective management of
public versus private competition.[Ref. 4] Industry
representatives cited the existence of an uneven playing field
while the NADEPs challenged the need for competition at
all.[Ref. 3] Other areas of contention included differences
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in required cost and capital equipment accounting
practices.[Ref. 4]
Since the initial competitions, considerable effort has
been expended to make the program more effective. Committees
composed of both industry and Government officials have been
formed to ensure that the interests and concerns of both are
defined. Draft rule changes to the Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement have been submitted to
further legitimatize public versus private competition.[Ref.
51 Congressional interest and involvement have grown steadily
and for'a number of reasons: First, from a desire to reduce
costs and trim defense budgets. Secondly, as a way to support
a weakened industrial base caused by defense downsizing. And
thirdly, from a more parochial view, to protect jobs in their
districts-which could be impacted by competition.[Ref. 61
This Thesis will examine the implementation of public
versus private competition within the NADEPs analyzing both
industry and Government views. It will also evaluate more
recent initiatives designed to improve competition
effectiveness and close by recommending future strategies for
achieving greater value from public versus private
competition.
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This Thesis examines the development of public versus
private competition as it has been applied to the NADEPs. It
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will analyze current trends both in and out of the Navy and
assess their effects on NADEP public/private competition. The
Thesis will close with strategic recommendations for improving
the effectiveness of competition within the NADEPs. This
Thesis will not detail industrial base issues although they
are linked to the initial goals established for public versus
private competition. Likewise, there are several areas
involving the competition program which have not been fully
resolved including disputes resolution. The purpose of this
paper is not to recommend solutions to every area of interest
but to analyze and recommend overall strategies for
effectiveness.
The principal limitation of this study will be the
relative newness of the program and lack of analytical data.
Several Government audits have been conducted and some
industrial associations have attempted to evaluate the
competition program, but these resources are limited and the
objectivity of some of the data should be questioned. The
competition program is also very dynamic, and legislative or
unilateral Government action could abruptly alter the scope of
the competition program and that of this Thesis.
E. THESIS M3THODOLOGY
This Thesis will utilize both Government (Federal, DoD,
and Navy) and industry sources in evaluating the effectiveness
of public versus private competition. A review of the origins
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of the program and initial successes and failures will be
drawn primarily from documents including General Accounting
Office (GAO) reports and internal Navy audits. More recent
developments will be analyzed following interviews with both
Government and industry representatives and following
literature searches from current and reliable publications and
periodicals. The fact that public versus private competition
is such a dynamic area requires that older information be
evaluated against the newest data to determine its continuing
applicablility. Individuals to be interviewed will be asked
a number of questions in which they will assess the program's
effectiveness thus far. They will also be asked to describe
the program's goals, identify both positive and negative
aspects of the program and make specific recommendations for
improving its effectiveness. In addition to interviews and
the literature review, a comparison will be made between the
first major public versus private competition program, the F-
14 and the most current award, the F-18 Modification,
Corrosion, and Paint Program (MCAPP), to determine if lessons
learned in previous competitions were implemented in this
newest program. These findings and recommendations will then
be analyzed and evaluated leading to a set of final
recommendations formulated by the researcher.
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F. RMIDNING CHAPTER DESCRIPTIONS
1. Chapter I1 Initial Program Analysis
This chapter will define public versus private
competition and describe its initial implementation into the
Naval Aviation Depots. It will also review the results of the
initial competition programs and describe what actions were
taken to improve program effectiveness.
2. Chapter III Program Evaluation-Industry Perspective
This chapter will examine recent industry concerns
regarding public versus private competition in the NADEPs.
This chapter will also provide industry recommendations.
3. Chapter IV Program Evaluation-Government Perspective
This chapter focuses on NADEP and Naval Air Systems
Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) concerns involving the program and
identifies its own initiatives for improving effectiveness.
4. Chapter V Evaluation of Recommendations
This chapter will evaluate recommendations and
initiatives against criteria such as budgetary constraints,
industrial base considerastions, and political reality.
5. Chapter VI Conclusions and Recommendations
This Thesis will conclude with a summary of the
current state of public versus private competition and a list
of recommendations to improve program effectiveness.
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Q. BEMFITS OF STUDY
This Thesis will provide both NAVAIR and the Naval
Aviation Depot Operations Center (NADOC) with an objective
analysis and evaluation of recommendations from both industry
and Government representatives. The recommendations should
balance industry and Government concerns while ensuring that
the Navy and NAVAIR receive the best overall value for their
depot maintenance dollar. Recommendations applicable to the
NADEPs may also have application to other programs and
military departments where depot competition is being
incorporated. The Thesis may also serve as a stepping-off
point for further research in the area of public versus
private competition, i.e., competition outside DoD, and
related areas, such as public versus public competition.
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II. INITIAL PROGRAM ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will define public versus private competition
and describe its initial implementation into the Naval
Aviation Depots. It will also review the results of the
initial competition programs and describe what actions were
taken to improve program effectiveness. Because Congressional
involvement and the resulting legislation created the program
and continues to have a significant impact, this chapter will
begin with a review of the legislative history efffecting
public versus private competition. That review will be
followed by a comprehensive program analysis centering on
initial program concerns including: maintenance of the "level
playing field," establishment of an "arms length relationship"
between all parties, and type of contract to be awarded to a
public activity. With this background, the stage will be set
for an analysis of current recommendations for program
improvement.
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In FY 85, Congress appropriated Operation and Maintenance-
Navy (OMN) funds for the:
.. alteration, overhaul and repair of naval vessels.
Funds shall be available for a test program to acquire the
overhaul of two or more vessels by competition between
10
public and private shipyards. The Secretary of the Navy
shall certify, prior to award of a contract under this
test, that the successful bid includes comparable
estimates of all direct and indirect costs for both public
and private shipyards. Competition under such test
program shall not be subject to section 502 of the
Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1981, as amended
or Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76. [Ref.
7]
The authority granted under the FY 85 legislation was
extended in FY 86 legislation and again in the FY 87
Appropriation for O&MN and in addition to applying to ship
overhauls was extended to include aircraft repair:
That from the amounts of this appropriation for the
alteration, overhaul and repair of naval vessels and
aircraft, funds shall be available to acquire the
alteration, overhaul, and repair by competition between
public and private shipyards and air rework facilities....
[Ref. 2]
The authority granted by the foregoing legislation was
extended by the following years' DoD Appropriations Acts with
minor modifications. In FY 1990, the legislation was altered
to reflect the name change approved for the air rework
facilities; changing the name from Naval Air Rework Facilities
(NARFs) to Naval Aviation Depots (NADEPs). The FY 90 Act also
authorized the NADEPs to perform manufacturing in order to
compete for production contracts. [Ref. 8] In FY 1991, the
Appropriations Act further extended the competition program to
the modification of aircraft, vehicles, and vessels as well as
the production of components and other defense-related
articles to all DoD depots.[Ref. 9]
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Congressional activity and involvement in the public
versus private competition program has been, and continues to
be, extensive. In addition to the legislation cited above,
the program has been affected by the language of the Committee
and Conference reports which have sought to clarify and
further define what can be competed under the program. A
comparison of Congressional initiatives with industry and Navy
recommendations will be included in Chapter V.
C. PROGRAM ANALYSIS
Public versus Private competition refers to a process used
in Government contracting in which public (Government owned
and operated) activities compete with privately owned
activities for Government contracts. In a typical Government
procurement, a well established procedure is followed in which
private industry and business compete against one another to
provide the Government with needed products and services.
Public/Private competition is unique because private
businesses compete directly against Government owned
"businesses" for a share of Government contracts. Government
(public) activities must learn to compete, a new situation for
most, and private businesses must recognize that Government
activities have other than pure "profit" goals. The situation
puts unique pressures on potential offerors and on the
procuring agency.
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Public/Private competition grew out of the recommendations
of the Packard Commission and subsequent Defense Management
Report (DMR) decisions [Ref. 10]. The Congress first
authorized Public/Private competition in the fiscal year (FY)
1985 Appropriations Act in which the Navy was authorized to
compete a limited number of ship overhauls and repairs [Ref.
11]. Although initial attempts at public/private competition
were plagued by implementation problems; [Ref. 3] the Congress,
recognizing the potential for cost savings and increased
efficiency, approved in the FY-87 Appropriations Act an
extension of public/private competition to the overhaul of
naval aircraft. As a result, most major work that had been
automatically assigned to the Naval Aviation Depots (NADEPs)
could then be assigned to the bidder offering the "best value"
to the Government. Additionally, NADEPs could then be allowed
to compete for work that had previously been competed among
private businesses only.[Ref. 3]
The first major maintenance work competed under the
program was the overhaul of the F-14 aircraft. The F-14
Scheduled Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM) solicitation called
for an of feror to provide 24 overhauls over five years with an
option for up to five additional aircraft per year. Not all
of the scheduled F-14 overhauls were competed so that if the
NADEPs were unsuccessful in receiving the award they would
still retain a core capability for mobilization and
contingency purposes. There were three proposals received,
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two from private contractors (one from the prime manufacturer)
and one submitted jointly by the NADEPs located at North
Island, California and Norfolk, Virginia. The proposal
submitted by the NADEPs was considered to offer the best value
to the Government so they were awarded a "fixed price
contract" in the amount of 81.8 million dollars, exclusive of
over-and-above work with overhauls beginning in late FY-88.
The contract period was for five years and the last aircraft
began overhaul in late 1992.[Ref. 3]
The results of the F-14 competition have been mixed. The
General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that competition
caused overhaul costs adjusted for inflation to decline about
23 percent from FY-87, the year before the start of the
program. However, the GAO report went on to say that "more
effective administration of the F-14 competition program would
have resulted in even more savings".[Ref. 3] The Auditor
General of the Navy, while recognizing the benefits accrued
from public/private competition, went on to say that:
... the Navy Deeded to provide additional direction to
fully implement public versus private competition for
aircraft rework and achieve expected program benefits
(i.e., reduced costs, improved efficiency, and expansion
of the industrial base).[Ref. 4]
The F-14 competition program highlighted a number of
issues that have prompted changes to Navy procedures and
agency regulations. Many of the recommended changes proposed
by the GAO or contained in the various audit or procurement
management reviews are just now being implemented. [Ref. 3]
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The effects of these changes are still being evaluated and
offer additional research opportunities.
Essentially all of the problems associated with
implementation of public/private competition in the F-14
program, and even in the earlier ship overhaul program were
directly related to a lack of adequate acquisition planning
during program development.[Ref. 12] Once the programs were
underway there was also a consistent lack of critical guidance
provided to subordinate activities on how the programs should
operate.[Ref. 12] This lack of pre-award planning and
guidance resulted in situations which challenged the fairness
and integrity of public/private competition within the
Navy.[Ref. 3] In the case of the F-14 program, the Navy and
specifically the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) were
forced to find solutions to three questions:
- How to establish and maintain a "level playing field"
for both public and private competitors?
- How to affect an "arms length relationship" between the
Navy activities involved in competition?
- What type of "contract" should be utilized if the NADEP
wins the award?
D. THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
The "level playing field" refers to a requirement that all
activities, public or private, should be held to the same
standards or requirements as any other activity that is
competing for or has been awarded a Government contract.
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Durii-g a Special Procurement Management Review of the
administration of public/private competition completed in
1989, several contractors expressed concern that the NADEPs
were not being held to same or similar post-award
administrative requirements that would be enforced on a
private contractor.[Ref. 11] These same concerns were
expressed in an interview with Mr. Nicholas M. Torelli, Jr.,
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production
Resources) whose impression was that the playing field is
still not exactly level. [Ref. 13]
The perception of an uneven playing field was created by
a lack of specific guidance during the planning, solicitation,
negotiation and award steps of the procurement. During the
planning phase when consideration of sourcing, evaluation,
contract type and contract administration should have been
taking place, little concern was given to the extensive post-
award requirements.[Ref. 14] It was particularly important
that the solicitation contain sufficient detail to alert the
NADEPs to post-award requirements. Competition in the NADEPs
was a relatively new phenomena while most of the requirements
which normally accompany a Defense Department contract are
well known and understood by private contractors. The NADEPs
were unaware of many of these requirements and not provided
with sufficient information in either the initial solicitation
or in the subsequent award to fully appreciate their
responsibilities.[Ref. 14] For example, the GAO noted that
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neither the Request for Proposal (RFP), nor the award,
explicitly required that the NADEPs track costs to the
detailed degree expected by the Administrative Project Officer
(APO).[Ref. 3]
It would have been virtually impossible to establish a
level playing field given the situation in which the Navy and
the NADEPs found themselves in 1988. [Ref. 12] When the NADEPs
competed and won the competition for the F-14 overhauls, they
assumed that procedures would remain as they were before
competition.[Ref. 14] Specifically, the NADEP would perform
maintenance up to an established financial limit stated in a
project order. In the event that additional modifications to
an aircraft were required the program manager would simply
notify the NADEP and send additional funding. [Ref. 15] These
former procedures had little of the controls and comparatively
little oversight of its rework and management functions that
would have been required of a private sector contractor. The
NADEP's unfamiliarity with contracting, a misunderstanding of
individual roles and responsibilities in the acquisition
process, the lack of a "contract", and incompatible cost
accounting systems all suggested that maintenance of a level
playing field was unlikely.[Ref. 14]
Thus far, the initial program analysis suggests that the
NADEPs were held to less rigorous requirements than a private
contractor and that therefore the Navy activities
benefitted.[Ref. 11] This was not always the case. Because
17
there was no "contractm during initial stages of NADEP
performance, the NADEPs were not allowed equitable price
adjustments for increased costs resulting from a new Federal
Employee Retirement System or changes in the quantity and
timing of aircraft received for rework.[Ref. 1i] A
competitively awarded commercial contract would have allowed
for equitable price adjustments for such changes.[Ref. 11]
The NADEPs also experienced another disadvantage in that they
were required to submit requisitions through the Navy Supply
Center for open purchase items. This process was much slower
and more costly than the use of subcontractors and vendors
utilized by commercial contractors.[Ref. 11] In these cases
the "playing field" became decidedly "unlevel" when
considering the Government's actions with respect to the
Navy.[Ref. 1i]
The need to establish and maintain a level playing field
is critical to the success of public/private competition and
provides fair and equitable treatment to both commercial
contractors and Government activities. [Ref. 16] The 1989
Special Procurement Management Review (PMR) of NADEP
competition concluded that there must be a commitment of both
time and resources "to formulate a sound acquisition strategy
and to develop appropriate pre-award and post-award
guidelines". [Ref. il] In 1991, the Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR) issued a new instruction, NAVAIR Instruction 4200.35,
which addressed administration of competitive procurement.
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This instruction introduced all aspects of "contract"
administration into pre-award considerations and should have
served to establish and maintain a level playing field in both
pre and post-award contracting activities and "ensure a fair
and equitable competition between public and private
competitors".[Ref. 17] Whether this actully occurred or not
will be evaluated in the remaining chapters.
Z. THE ARMS LENGTH RELATIONSHIP
Another significant issue which has driven changes in pre-
award activities has been the need to create and maintain an
arms length relationship between the various Navy activities
involved in public/private competition for aircraft overhaul.
Arms length relationship describes the extent to which
relationships should exist between the buyer and seller or in
the case of this study between the Navy (NAVAIR) and the
activity (public or private) which receives the contract
award. Relationships are expected to be businesslike while
avoiding actions or behavior which might be construed to be
potential conflicts of interest. Similarly, the relationship
should not be adversarial in nature. The premise is that by
maintaining an arms length relationship all parties will be
treated equitably and fairly. The FAR provides procedures and
guidelines to facilitate this relationship in dealings between
NAVAIR and private contractors; it is much less clear in
dealings between NAVAIR and their subordinate NADEPs. [Ref. 18]
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Prior to the implementation of public/private competition,
aircraft which were to be overhauled or modified were
identified by NAVAIR and then a particular NADEP through the
Naval Aviation Depot Operations Center (NADOC) would be
assigned the work. Because NAVAIR operated NADOC and the
NADEPs, the assignment process was routine and simply involved
issuing a project order. NAVAIR and NADOC were also
responsible for monitoring NADEP compliance with the project
order.[Ref. 19]
After the implementation of public/private competition the
situation did not change appreciably except that NAVAIR had to
go through more steps to award the project order. [Ref. 14)
NAVAIR continued to select the airframes for rework or
modification but also decided which to compete and which not
to compete. NAVAIR also developed the source evaluation
criteria that would be applied to its own NADEPs and the
commuercial bidders. NAVAIR made the source selection, placing
it in a position of choosing between one of its subordinate
activities and a private contractor. And of course, NAVAIR
might be required to provide contract administration of the
award made to its own activity. This process suggested that
there was the possibility of serious, potential conflicts of
interest and the lack of an arms-length relationship between
NAVAIR and the NADEPs.
During audits and reviews of the F-14 Program, suggestions
of conflict of interest or failure to maintain an arms-length
20
relationship focused on: 1) the selection of programs to be
competed 2) lack of role and responsibility definitions and
3) post-award contract administration. Interestingly, the
potential for bias in proposal evaluation or source selection
was not discussed.[Refs. 3 and 4]
F. SELECTION OF CANDIDATE PROGRAMS
The Auditor General of the Navy found that among the
reasons for the Navy failing to realize the greatest benefits
from the public/private competition process, three dealt with
the selection of candidate programs. They were:
- NAVAIR did not properly identify the pool of potential
candidates for competition.
- NAVAIR did not establish effective guidance for
selecting candidates, and did not fully define the
responsibilities of all parties involved in the process.
- The system used to select aircraft rework candidates for
competition relied on program managers who did not have
an objective selection system.[Ref. 4]
By limiting the possible rework candidates, NAVAIR was
essentially limiting the number of programs on which
commercial contractors could compete. Without an objective
selection system it could appear that NAVAIR selected programs
for competition where the NADEPs had the best chance of being
awarded the project. It should be noted however, that the
evidence does not support that conclusion. Of the four
initial competitions, two were awarded to Depots and two to
commercial activities.[Ref. 3]
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The audit report also suggested that considerably greater
cost savings could have been realized had NAVAIR competed a
larger percent of the potentially eligible work. While the
resulting 22 percent savings was impressive, it represents
only 1.9 percent of the work potentially eligible for
competition.[Ref. 4]
As a result of these findings and in an attempt to meet
the savings goals of the Defense Management Report (DMR),
NAVAIR announced in 1991 that it planned to expand the
public/private competition program over the next three
years. [Ref. 3] Figure I lists those airframe and engine
systems which are planned for public/private competition.
The increased number of systems available for competition
should have provided greater cost savings through the
competitive process and just as importantly, reduced the
perception that the Navy's limited candidate selection
represented a conflict of interest and violated the arms
length relationship.
G. ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY DEFINITION
Another problem area which was identified in early audits
and reviews of public/private competition was the lack of a
clear definition of the roles and responsibilities assigned to
Navy officials in both pre and post-award phases of the
competition. The failure to clearly define these roles
exacerbated the impression to many that the whole competition
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Data from the General Accounting Office Report; Navy
Maintenance: Public/Private Competition for F-14 Aircraft
Maintenance, May 1992
Note: Although not listed in the schedule for future
competition, the F-14 overhaul work will be re-competed when
the current program is completed.
program was unorganized and could not support the maintenance
of an arms-length relationship within the NAVAIR organization
involved in source selection and contract administration. [Ref.
111 In conducting the Procurement Management Review of 1989,
the review staff noted that with the multiple officials
involved in the process and with no official clearly "in
charge", it was virtually impossible to obtain guidance or
decisions involving the competition. In the words of the
report, "There was no NAVAIR organization charged with
providing advice or guidance in administering competitive
project orders". [Ref. 11] Personnel responsible for developing
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the acquisition plan, including such planning factors as
determining the composition of the source selection authority
and contract administration activity, were not given adequate
guidance to make these determinations early in the
program.[Ref. 20]
It was not until the NADEPs had won the P-14 competition
that NAVAIR developed its plan for administration of the
competitive overhauls.[Ref. 3] The most significant NAVAIR
decision, in terms of ensuring that an arms-length
relationship was maintained, was the establishment of
Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) position at NAVAIR's
subordinate command, the Naval Aviation Depot Operations
Center (NADOC). (Ref. 20] This position, known as the
"successor PCO", was charged with managing and providing
oversight for post-award aspects of the competition. [Ref. 21]
It was not until 6 December 1991, when NAVAIR Instruction
4200.35 was issued, (four years after the initial F-14 award)
that specific roles and responsibilities for both pre- and
post-award activities were definitized. The stated purpose of
the Instruction was "...to establish policy and provide
guidance by which NAVAIR will determine, conduct, and
administer competitive procurement between public sector depot
activities ail private companies". [Ref. 17] This Instruction,
used in conjunction with NAVAIR Instruction 4200.24A,
Selection of Contracting Sources for Major Aircraft and
Missile Systems Acquisitions, clarified the process from
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selection and approval of candidate systems, source selection,
and contract administration to dispute resolution.[Ref. 22]
The NAVAIR Instruction 4200.35 went even further in its
attempts to ensure that an arms-length relationship was
maintained between NAVAIR and its subordinate depots.
Specifically:
The Deputy Assistant Commander for Aviation Depots (AIR-
43) and the NADEPs will be functionally separated from the
procuring activity for all issues relating to
competitions. Individuals participating in the
preparation of solicitation documents and evaluation of
proposals are considered procurement officials, and must
have signed the appropriate Procurement Integrity
Certification. [Ref. 17]
Although the NAVAIR Instruction was a considerable
improvement over a situation in which responsibilities and
policy were vague or undefined, recent experience indicates
that it did not adequately clarify contract administration
procedures.[Ref 23]
H. WHAT TYPE "CONTRACT"
The first section of this analysis focused on the
challenges of maintaining a "level playing field" in
competitions between public and private activities and the
pre-award activities implemented to facilitate that goal. The
second section focused on efforts to maintain an "arms-length
relationship" between the procuring activity, NAVAIR, and an
offeror, a subordinate NAVAIR activity. This third section
identifies the primary tool used to accomplish the objectives
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of a level playing field and an arms-length relationship; the
Work Assignment Document (WAD).
During the initial years of public/private competition
there was considerable confusion and disagreement between
NAVAIR (and later NADOC) and the NADEPs performing competitive
work.[Ref. 24] NAVAIR and its PCOs wanted to administer the
award like a contract between themselves and the NADEPs. The
NADEPs, on the other hand, wanted to continue business as
usual. That is, the NADEPs felt that once they had won the
award all procedures would remain as they had been prior to
the implementation of public/private competition. This
confusion resulted in disputes and appeals, several of which
are still pending. This same misunderstanding and lack of
NAVAIR guidance was responsible for initial cost overruns of
$289,000 on each of the first 24 F-14 competition
overhauls.[Ref. 3]
Prior to implementation of public/private competition,
NADEPs were issued project orders for the aircraft assigned
for rework. The NADEPs were paid the total amount authorized,
regardless of the actual amount of work required, much like a
firm-fixed price type contract. In some cases the total
effort exceeded what was normally expected and specified in
the project order. After the introduction of public/private
competition, NAVAIR required all work "over and above" the
terms of the project order to be approved by an Administrative
Project Officer (APO). The NADEPs reluctantly complied but
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complained that the approval process was time consuming and
unnecessary.[Ref. 3] The project order initially used after
competition was very similar to the project order used prior
to competition, making it difficult for the NADEPs to
recognize the difference in what was essentially a funding
document.[Ref. 11] Additionally, terms and conditions which
would have been required for private sector awards were
eliminated from the NADEP project orders making it appear that
nothing had significantly changed, and that the NADEPs should
conduct business as usual.[Ref. 11]
In response to these problems and following the
recommendations of the Special PMR of 1989, NAVAIR developed
the Work Assignment Document (WAD) as its "contract" with the
NADEPs. The WAD was subsequently incorporated into NAVAIR
Instruction 4200.35 in December 1991. The following excerpt
describes the WAD:
The work assignment document issued to the public activity
will be the sole controlling document, within the
limitations of the funding document, for the work to be
performed. While the document is not a contract, it is an
agreement between NAVAIR/PEO and a public activity.
a. The public activity agrees to:
(1) perform to a specified statement of work;
(2) deliver the product following with a delivery
schedule;
(3) complete the work at the price/cost bid in their
proposal; and
(4) perform the work following specified
requirements.
b. NAVAIR/PEO agrees to fund the approved work
performed.[Ref. 17]
The implementation of the work assignment document, while
not a contract, should help ensure that specifics contained in
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solicitation, and guidance contained in the various NAVAIR
instructions are successfully implemented once the NADEP
"contract" is awarded.[Ref. 24]
I. CHAPTER SUXOAY
Since the Navy's first experience with public/private
competition for ship overhauls in 1985, through the inclusion
of Naval aircraft in 1987, and through today, the Navy has
tried to improve the effectiveness of public/private
competition. With regard to aircraft overhaul, NAVAIR has
incorporated virtually every recommendation contained in past
Procurement Management Reviews, GAO audits, and Naval Audit
Service reports. Their efforts to ensure that a level playing
field is maintained, and that an arms-length relationship
exists between NAVAIR and the NADEPs, has given rise to new
instructions, procedures, and draft change proposals to the
DFARS. Likewise, the development and utilization of the Work
Assignment Document for Navy activities has served to
eliminate confusion and disagreement that had weakened the
strengths inherent in public/private competition.
There continues to be significant Congressional interest
in all depot activities. As more aircraft programs move from
production to support, private sector interest in competing
with public depots for overhauls and modifications will
increase. [Ref. 13] Figure II illustrates the dollar values
involved in terms of Department of the Navy budgeted aircraft
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maintenance funds. Many commercial firms are increasiLgly
viewing rework/modification type work as an additional source
of revenue, and as a way to remain in the Defense
marketplace.[Ref. 16]
ACTIVE FORCES AIRCRAFT DEPOT MAINTENANCE
(In Millions of Dollars)
FY 1993FY 1994FY 1995
AIRFRAMES 354.0 514.8 482.6
ENGINES 177.4 226.0 241.1
COMPONENTS 13.2 25.0 29.4
SUPPORT SERVICES 38.3 22.6 24.0
TOTAL: AIRCRAFT DEPOT MAINTENANCE 582.9 788.4 777.1
(In Units)
AIRFRAMES BACKLOGGED 103 100 100
ENGINES BACKLOGGED 250 250 250
FIGURE II
SOURCE:
Data from the Department of the Navy FY 1994/1995 Biennial
Budget and revised FY 1993 budget plan, . October 1992
Given the great deal of effort expended to make public
versus private competition more effective, how successful have
the architects been in achieveing their goals? Opinions vary
between Government and industry. The next two chapters offer
the latest industry and Government perspectives on public
versus private competition and their recommendations for
further improving the program.
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III. PROGRAM EVALUATION-INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE
A. INTRODUCTION
The preceding chapters have laid the foundation for more
indepth analysis and evaluation of public versus private
competition. While Chapter II described the initial
implementation of the program, the remaining chapters will
evaluate the program's effectiveness from two different
viewpoints; that of industry and that of the Navy. The
recommendations endorsed by each will then be evaluated
against criteria such as budgetary constraints, manpower
limitations, and political reality.
This chapter introduces what is generically called the
"industry" view of public versus private competition.
Obviously, there are many individual firms interested in the
concept of public activities competing against private firms.
As might be expected, the major firms with the most to gain or
lose are firms like Grumman, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, and
a number of others. Other, smaller firms are also included in
the term "industry." These firms represent various tier
subcontractors and individual suppliers, all of whom have a
vested interest in the policies and procedures which govern
the implementation of public/private competition.
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Research indicates that industry views tend to be
homogenous. That is, throughout the aerospace, electronics,
and even smaller business sectors, there is a consistent
philosophy or position on public/private competition. [Ref. 25]
This became very evident when articles, point papers, and
letters written by industry to elected officials all presented
the same positions. This may be partly the result of strong,
vocal industry associations which strive to educate their
members, and in turn serve as a single voice for the industry.
Examples of industry associations are the Aerospace Industries
Association (AIA) and the American Electronics Association
(AEA). Other groups which represent industries across various
trades include the American Defense Preparedness Association
(ADPA) and the National Security Industrial Association
(NSIA). These various associations consistently present a
single perspective or view of public/private competition. For
this reason, this chapter will rely heavily on data and
information provided by the Aerospace Industries Association
(AIA). The AIA represents industries involved in
public/private competition and has tasked a standing
committee, the Product Support Committee, to evaluate and
review the state of public/private competition and lobby for
changeswhere industry feels change is needed. This was the
purpose of the 52nd Annual Fall Product Support Committee
Conference held 25-28 October 1993. The topic of that
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conference was OPublic/Private Sector Roles in Industrial Base
Downsizing."[Ref. 26]
Industry consistently cites three important issue areas
which they claim have thus far undermined and invalidated
public/private competition:
0 The continuing uneven playing field
* Tnadequate cost comparability
* Lack of a definite, defined "core" workload [Ref. 25]
The remainder of this chapter will detail the central
issues which industry believes impacts the effectiveness of
public/private competition and list their recommendations on
how best to improve the program. An analysis of those
recommendations will be include in Chapter V.
B. UNEVEN PLAYING FIELD
Following the initial award of the first major
public/private competition, the F-14 SDLM, industry began to
voice its concerns that a fair and level playing field was not
being maintained in the competitions. Specifically, industry
concerns included the appearance of conflicts of interest in
the selection of candidate programs for competitions, the
unclear roles and responsibilities of individuals involved in
the source selection process, and the marked difference in the
way "contracts" were administered between Navy activities and
private firms.[Ref. 27] As Chapter II pointed out, the Navy
responded to these criticisms by formalizing roles and
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responsibilities, establishing the work assignment document as
a "contract", and creating a conLract administration
organization at each public activity that was awarded work
under public/private competition.[Ref. 3]
More recent industry concerns categorized under level
playing field issues do not include matters of candidate
program selection or role and responsibility definitions.
Instead, industry suggests that the playing field can never be
made level. The AIA goes on to say:
The inherent differences in the rules that bind the public
and private sectors are significant and, in our opinion,
can never be made equitable .... Just a few of the more
irreconcilable issues appear to be cost of borrowing
money, profit, industry tax accounting versus government
accounting, penalties or failure, Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) and Truth in Negotiation requiremEats for
industry, required data disclosure, and on and on. [Ref.
27]
Several descriptive examples will explain and frame the
issues listed above. First, the cost of borrowing money,
particularly for capital improvements. Industry reports that
their costs of borrowing are included in proposals as a cost
of doing business and therefore drive up the total contract
price. [Ref. 25] The Government, on the other hand, continues
to invest in capital improvements at facilities involved in or
potentially involved in public/private competitions, but does
not include those costs in their proposals for competitive
workloads. [Ref. 25] The issue of capitalization is closely
related to capacity and to defense industrial base issues
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which are necessarily beyond the scope of this Thesis.
However, the Government's ability to continually upgrade
existing depots' capabilities and therefore increase capacity
without reporting these costs in contract pricing seems
patently unfair.[Ref. 27] The AIA's perspective is that:
Defense base investments are continuing more from a desire
to bolster and improve depot facilities to compete for
more work and bring work back in-house from industry than
from a consideration of base integrity. Such investments
are not in the best interests of the American people, but
stem from an understandable motive of self-preservation
and job protection .... Look at the capabilities in both
industry and Government and you very quickly understand
why the government facilities are moving so quickly to
facilitize and improve: They have very little capability
that exceeds what industry already has.
That is changing because industry has all but stopped
capitalizing while the Government, unconstrained by market
forces, continues willy-nilly.[Ref. 27]
While the taxpayer is paying for the infrastructure at
Government facilities, none of this is counted in cost
comparisons, thus contributing even further to an uneven
playing field.[Ref. 27] Two other issues that industry
reports as having an unevening effect on the level playing
field are the impact of penalties for failure, and
profit.[Ref. 27] Government activities do not need to make a
profit, so that factor is not calculated into a proposed
price. Industry depots are expected, and even required by
shareholders, to earn some level of profit. In the case of
firm fixed-price (FFP) contracts, greater risks should entitle
the contractor to greater profits.[Ref. 28]
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Risks which impact on profit and loss (penalties for
failure) are not assessed equivalently between sectors;
industry is offered a FFP contract, forcing it to bear all
risks of cost overruns, program changes, etc. The
Government has no cost overrun penalty if its estimates
are incorrect or omitted. It can defer portions of the
workload to the next fiscal year or it can seek additional
funding from the Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF),
and is often awarded, in effect, a cost plus type
contract.[Ref. 25]
Both of the preceding examples lead to industry claims
that the Government has a marked advantage in competitions
because they, the Government, are omitting certain costs and
profits from contract proposals. Other issues, including
apparent conflicts of interest in source selection, (the same
Government entity that is competing the contract and bidding
on it is often the Source Selection Authority who picks the
"winner" of the competition) also contribute to industry's
belief that a level playing field will be impossible to
achieve in public/private competitions.[Ref. 27]
C. INADEQUATE COST COMPARABILITY
A second major issue area voiced by industry involves cost
comparability between public and private sector proposals for
competitive workloads. First, what is cost comparability?
Cost comparability provides for ease of comparison between two
or more offerors by applying adjustments to proposed
cost/prices. When cost comparability analysis is expected to
be used in public/private competitions, it must be described
in the solicitation. [Ref. 29] Cost comparability facilitates
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comparison of activities whose cost accounting systems do not
estimate, accumulate, or report in the same manner as a
competitor. More succinctly,
.. cost comparability, an analysis that leads to a yes/no
decision as to whether the costs are comparable between
the public and private bidders. The analysis focuses on
several adjustment factors used to equate the offer
received from the public bidder with that of the private
bidder.[Ref. 4]
A 1992 General Accounting Office (GAO) report supported
industry views that invalid NADEP labor and material cost were
challenging the fairness of public/private competitions. [Ref.
3] While this audit and other reviews were underway, the Navy
took several significant steps toward correcting the
discrepancies. Among these were:
"* Improvements in the Navy Industrial Fund Management System
(NIFMS) in terms of both hardware and software.[Ref. 15]
"* Upgrades in individual NADEP systems to accumulate and
report costs in the required detail necessary under
private/public competition.[Ref. 4]
"* Steps to ensure more thorough and consistent cost reviews
are made of overhead and labor cost figures in
proposals.[Ref. 4]
Perhaps the most significant step towards correcting the
discrepancies, was the implementation of the NAVAIR
Instruction 4200.35 which carefully spelled out public/private
competition within Naval Aviation, and required the use of
cost comparability analysis in the evaluation of all costs.
This analysis became a requirement during the source selection
process. Once a successful offeror had been identified, the
Source Selection Authority had to advise the Secretary of the
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Navy of the results of the cost comparability and cost realism
analyses.[Ref. 17]
The NAVAIR Instruction required that cost comparability
would be performed following the procedures outlined in the
Defense Depot Maintenance Council's Cost Comparability
Handbook, and provided examples of typical adjustment factors
as an appendix to the Instruction.[Ref. 17]
Although efforts were made by Navy and Department of
Defense oýficials to ensure that cost comparability analysis
was incorporated into NAVAIR procedures following the initial
F-14 SDLM competition, industry remains concerned that the
application of cost comparability has not been adequate to
place competitors on a level playing field. [Ref. 28] In a
recent article, industry complained that current techniques do
not provide realistic comparisons, and that until they are
corrected it will be virtually impossible to win a
competition.[Ref. 28] One industry spokesman said,"Industry
can't afford to bid and bid and bid and lose. Some companies
may not be around to enjoy accountability down the road."
[Ref. 30]
Among the cost comparison issues raised by industry
(relative to the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy) were:
"* Cost of corporate headquarters. The Air Force does not
include headquarters costs in its bids, but will start
including them in fiscal 1994.
"* Oversight costs. "Twenty percent of our time is spent
dealing with Government harassment," one company president
said.
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"* Retirement. The Air Force includes retirement costs for
civilian employees but not for military personnel.
"* Taxes, which the military does not pay.
"* Profit, the military does not need to make any.
"* Medical benefits. Service bids include benefit costs for
civilian employees, but not for uniformed personnel.
"* Government knowledge of industry pricing methods from
previous work.[Ref. 28]
Industry concerns with NAVAIR cost comparisons center on
computation of overhead and discretionary costs. For example,
prior to Fiscal Year 1989, Norfolk and North Island NADEPs
allocated overhead costs on the basis of direct labor hours
incurred by a cost center. During F-14 SDLM performance, both
began allocating on the basis of total costs incurred.
Although the new accounting method was an acceptable practice,
it resulted in a greater share of general overhead costs being
allocated to engine and component repair cost centers and less
overhead to airframe cost centers.[Ref. 3] In effect, costs
which had been allocated to competitive airframe cost centers
were shifted to non-competitive engine and component
workcenters.
Although overhead application was addressed in both the
Cost Comparability Handbook and the NAVAIR Instruction,
industry points out that the situation described above is not
specifically covered by either. For example, the Handbook
requirements for allocating and accumulating overhead can be
summed up as: procedures must be rational and
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consistent.[Ref. 291 The NAVAIR Instruction specifies that
*non-competitive workload will not be used to finance costs
that according to generally accepted accounting practices,
should be a proper cost to the competitive workload." [Ref. 17]
Industry complains that as long as total overhead is allowed
to be allocated to non-competitive workcenters where there is
not competitive pressure to reduce costs, the ability to
accurately compare overhead rates is in jeopardy.[Ref. 25]
Another issue involving NAVAIR cost comparisons deals with
discretionary costs. Discretionary costs refer to employee
cash incentive payments and capital equipment purchases. They
are not considered gains but a part of the cost of doing
business. They are not profits, although some past bids have
included the term "profit" for discretionary costs.[Ref. 29)
The confusion results from the fact that if the NADEP performs
within its proposed costs, discretionary funds are available
to award employees, but if the NADEP experiences a cost
overrun then the discretionary funds are used to offset the
overrun to a avoid a loss.[Ref. 17]
Even with more detailed procedures for evaluating cost for
realism and comparability, and the requirement to certify
public/private competitive proposals for comparable costs,
industry continues to believe that cost comparability is at
best inadequate and fails to address all the differences that
exist between public and private activities. [Ref. 16] AIA
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President, Don Fugua, said in a letter to Dr. William Perry,
Deputy Secretary of Defense, that:
It has become even more obvious that entrepreneurship is
alive in the Public sector: investments are occurring
using Research and Development funds, Acquisition Program
funds, Military Construction funds, and possibly other
sources. This cavalier proliferation of DoD funding
sources reaffirms the difficulty of defining comparable
costs between Government and industry.[Ref. 31]
D. LACK OF A DEFINITE, DEFINID NCORNE WORKLOAD
During numerous interviews with industry representatives,
one theme seems to be constant; the core workload reserved for
public depots must be identified. [Ref. 16] It is difficult to
separate and distinguish industry perspectives on defining
core workloads and strengthening a downsized industrial base.
In this Thesis the focus will be on identifying what programs
and what quantity of weapon systems should be competed.
Beginning with the F-14 SDLM competition and in subsecuent
competitions, NAVAIR decided which systems and how many of
each system would be competed. [Ref. 3] The limited selection
of candidate programs led industry to believe that NAVAIR
selected programs for competition which they knew could
win.[Ref. 3] In addition to the perception of conflicts of
interest and the lack of an "arms length relationship", an ill
defined workload left industry without any plan for what level
of capability or capacity they might be required to retain in
order to compete.[Ref. 16]
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In early 1991 discussions of core depot maintenance
essentially meant all overhaul work. These overhauls included
Scheduled Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM) and the Modification,
Corrosion-and Paint Program (MCAPP), which are scheduled based
on equipment in-service hours, as well as major modifications,
upgrades, and repairs. [Ref. 4] An industry view of core
workload and industry's position on who is best suited to
perform that work is contained in the following excerpt from
AIA's background paper entitled, "Nationalization of the
Aerospace Industry":
In 1992, the Assistant Secretary of Defense estimated that
75-80% of the total depot level workload was in the
organic system. Typically, for a newly fielded weapon
system, after a brief period of interim contractor
support, the depot workload follows its preplanned
scenario into an assigned organic depot for the remainder
of its service life. Once bedded-down, it would be termed
a "Core" workload. Congressional support for the organic
system is, in part, based on the false premise that core
workloads are inherently governmental. Not sol They are
simply workloads ideally suited for long term steady
employment because they have predictable and heavy depot
return rates. In almost every case, the OEM (original
equipment manufacturer) is tethered to these workloads to
provide essential services which the depots do not
possess--namely, cognizant manufacturing and testing
capabilities which are outside the scope of the depots
limited repair and overhaul expertise. In all but the
simplest of workloads, the original equipment
manufacturers have built the tooling, done the training,
built and installed the test equipment, and maintained the
technical data which frames the depots' capabilities. In
no way should a taxpayer or congressman believe core
workloads are inherently governmental. This claim must be
vigorously challenged.[Ref. 25]
More recent trends and conmments made during interviews by
industry and trade associations recognize that some capacity,
a redefined core, does belong in the NADEPs.[Ref 5] Loosely
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defined, that core would be limited to certain expeditious
repair and overhauls necessary to maintain a surge capability
within the NADEPs. Major overhauls and upgrades/modifications
would go to industry. [Ref. 28] This definition of core and
its apportionment between industry and the public depots is
similar to the Navy's latest strategy and will be discussed
more fully in Chapters IV and V.
Z. INDUSTRY RECOMElNDATIONS
These three major issues: continuing uneven playing field;
inadequate cost comparability; and lack of a definite, defined
core; represent the major concerns and perspective that
industry holds regarding public/private competition. The
following industry recommendations were listed in a joint
letter from seven different trade associations to
Representative Earl Hutto, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of
Representatives:
"* Government-industry competitions should be replaced by
competitions within industry for the majority of the
workload, with Government competitions for that determined
to be the "core" inherently governmental depot maintenance
work.
"* DoD should carry out public sector reductions in
modification and depot maintenance capabilities as fast or
faster than the private sector.
"* The Government should not be permitted to make additional
capital investments in its depot facilities until a more
realistic division of labor between Government and
industry has been determined for this type of work.
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"* Congress should eliminate the existing arbitrary statutory
40 percent limitation on private sector performance of
depot maintenance workloads which was mandated in the FY
1993 DoD Authorization Act. DoD should determine what
minimum requirements are not suited for contractor
performance, and that should become the new definition of
"core."
"* We support Secretary Aspin's "bottom-up" review, and
encourage this effort to identify the Service's minimum
essential core capabilities.
"* Government facilities and their management should be
penalized when they experience cost overruns on depot
maintenance, modification or upgrade programs which have
been awarded competitively. Public sector accountability,
such as performance audits being considered by the Office
of Management and Budget, must be established through past
performance considerations on bids for new work. The
current practice of rolling cost overruns into the next
budget cycle should be prohibited.
"* Congress should pass legislation that prevents Government
depots from competing against the private sector on small
business set-aside contracts.[Ref. 30]
F. CHAPTER SUMOARY
Industry, meaning the various large and small firms,
subcontractors, and suppliers who build and support systems
provided to the DoD have through research and experience
drafted a set of recommendations for improving the
effectiveness of public/private competitions. Their
recommendations directly and indirectly address the three
major issues impacting competition: the uneven playing field,
inadequate cost comparability, and lack of a definite and
defined "core".
The general sentiment within industry is that
public/private competition can not work. "Competitions
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between the public sector and private industry are inherently
flawed for a variety of reasons."[Ref. 30] For example:
Much of this work is restricted with no good cause to
Government performance by existing Congressional
direction. That which is competed with industry is done
so under terms and conditions unfavorable to industry.
There is no level playing field. Cost comparison
guidelines do not take into consideration the differences
between public and private sector requirements.
Additionally, the Government sector picks the items to be
competed, writes the request for proposals, creates the
rules of selection and then picks the winners of contacts
for which they themselves compete.[Ref. 32
Summarizing industry's perspective is this excerpt from
AIA's "Nationalization of the Aerospace Industry":
Many leaders in the Government depot system believe
public/private competition is the solution to
rationalizing the Defense Industrial Base. Unfortunately,
this thinking is based on the notion that public/private
competition, as we know it, is fair. Industry's firm
position is that Government depots have an unsurmountable
advantage over private contractors in fixed-price
competitions.... It is the AIA's position, backed by
recent experience of its membership, that competitions
between public and private sectors is fundamentally
inconsistent with free market principles. Accordingly,
industry seeks depot workload assignments through the
medium of a carefully constructed national policy designed
to further the viability and competitiveness of the entire
Aerospace Industry.[Ref. 25]
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IV. PROGRAM EVALUATION - GOVER)UT PER PECTI VE
A. I TRODUCTION
The previous chapter began the evaluation of
public/private competition from an industry perspective. Even
with the large number and size of firms involved, providing a
wide range of design, manufacturing, and support capabilities,
there was generally agreement on what the "industry"
perspective should be.
This chapter, Program Evaluation - Government Perspective,
will not present such a homogenous set of perspectives or
recommendations. Initially, this chapter was entitled Program
Evaluation - Navy Perspective. But, in the course of
research, it soon became apparent that public/private
competition was no longer a singular Navy issue. Even in
NAVAIR competitions, the NADEPs compete against other Services
as well as against private sector firms. This interservice
participation and competition, OSD involvement, and
conflicting views among the Services elevate public/private
competition to at least an agency level issue, and more recent
Congressional concerns have elevated it to a national
issue. [Ref. 33] As the chapter will show, there is currently
a general lack of consensus on what the Government's policy is
or should be. Multiple perspectives will be presented along
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with their respective recommendations for improving the
conduct of public/private competition.
The chapter begins with a brief review of the Navy's
involvement in public/private competition with an emphasis on
early program goals and achievements. That section will be
followed by a discussion of NAVAIR's most recent initiatives
to improve their public/private competition program. Next,
public/private competition will be reviewed from an
interservice perspective. The competition program will then
be evaluated from an OSD view and lastly from a Congressional
and legislative perspective. After examining each
perspective, it will become evident that there is little
consensus Government-wide regarding public/private
competition.
B. INITIAL NAVY STRATEGY
As Chapter II indicated, the Navy's involvement with
public/private competition began in 1986 when Navy shipyards
were allowed to compete with private sector shipyards for ship
overhauls. [Ref. 3] These competitions reportedly resulted in
reduced cost to the Navy and the taxpayer by encouraging
competition and forcing the Navy shipyards to incorporate
techniques and procedures that would improve their level of
efficiency.[Ref. 3] In 1987, public/private competition was
extended to the Naval Aviation Depots so that they could
benefit from competition driven efficiencies.[Ref. 34] Like
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early shipyard competitions, the Navy's first major aircraft
overhaul competition also resulted in significant cost savings
on non-competed workloads. Yet, as the GAO reported in 1992,
considerably greater cost savings could have been
realized.(Ref. 3] The Navy's attempts to capture even more
cost savings resulted in a larger number of systems being
identified for competition and incorporation of many of the
GAO report recommendations.
As the F-14 SDLM award to NADEPs Norfolk and North Island
were being executed, and as the legislative authority for
public/private competition was expanded, the Navy's early
enthusiasm for the program waned. Industry concerns over the
level playing field, individual NADEP concerns about future
awards, and the difficulties of incorporating the GAO
recommendations challenged some within NAVAIR to question the
viability of the competition program.[Refs. 18 and 21]
Industry's concern over the level playing field consumed
much of Chapter III and will not be restated here except to
say that the Navy, in an attempt to level the playing field,
took steps early to correct discrepancies. Efforts continued
until eventually a new NAVAIR Instruction was implemented,
which was designed to level the playing field for industry and
the depots.[Ref. 17] Industry's continuing assertion of a
lack of fairness frustrated proponents of the program,
particularly given the effort expanded thus far to improve
public/private competition.[Ref. 24]
47
A second source of concern, which was not adequately
addressed by the Navy's initial strategy, were individual
NADEP concerns regarding future competition awards.
Specifically, several sources interviewed for this Thesis
suggested that the Navy's approach to public/private
competition did not include the effects of competition on the
individual NADEPs. [Ref. 14] Chapter II identified situations
in which the NADEPs did not fully understand the steps and
procedures necessary for proposal development. Additionally,
it noted that when the NADEPs won the F-14 SDLM award, many
believed that previous procedures for administering the
workload would continue, when in fact those procedures would
change significantly.[Ref. 12] The requirement to receive
prior approval for "over and above" work from an
Administrative Project Officer (APO) created problems for line
supervisors and artisans who had not been required to receive
any such approval before the advent of competitive workloads.
The APO's determination to disallow a number of NADEP claims
in this area eventually resulted in several disputes which are
still being resolved.(Ref. 121
More recent concerns voiced by the NADEPs have hinged on
the future of the NADEPs themselves. The issues are similar
to the ones which were identified with industry in Chapter
III. Depot concerns include: What will be the core level of
work which will be retained within the NADEPs; How can the
NADEPs be treated more fairly in comparison with industry; and
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to what degree are the NADEPs calculated in the defense
industrial base?[Ref. 35] During a recent visit to NADEP
Norfolk, a major concern was the possibility of losing what
had been Government work to the private sector. This
sentiment was most apparent following the announcement that
NADEP Norfolk was identified for closure by the 1993 Base
Realignment and Closure Commission.[Ref. 23]
In addition to industry's reference to the lack of a level
playing field and the NADEP's concerns over the results of
future competitions, the Navy's initial strategy was further
challenged by its difficulty in incorporating GAO
recommendations designed to improve the program. The most
difficult. GAO recommendation to fully implement has involved
cost comparability.[Ref. 36] Cost comparability was defined
in chapter III as an analysis and technique by which proposals
from the public sector could be compared with offers from the
private sector. As experience has grown with public\private
competition, more and more costs are being identified which
require comparability analysis and adjustments. [Ref. 29] The
latest revision of the Cost Comparability Handbook included
thirteen major changes to incorporate these requirements. [Ref.
29] Given the level of effort on behalf of DoD and the Navy
to implement comparability improvements, neither industry nor
the NADEPs are fully satisfied.[Refs. 12 and 27]
A second issue related to cost comparability has been the
NADEP's inability to implement a system of cost accounting
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which allocates costs to the degree required to execute the
work assignment document in the same manner as a contract
awarded to private industry.[Ref. 12] Even after the
implementation of the Navy Industrial Fund Information
Management System (NIFIMS), the required degree of cost
reporting was still not available.[Ref. 12] Although
development of a modification to the system has been
developed, implementation into the individual NADEPs has been
slow. Additionally, each depot must now re-evaluate prior
cost estimates to test their validity to a new allocation
system. [Ref. 12]
These issues; industry's continuing belief that an uneven
playing field exists, NADEP concerns over future award
requirements, and the difficulty of implementing the
recommendations of the GAO have forced the Navy to re-evaluate
its concept of public/private competition. Other factors
which have also had an impact on the degree and direction of
public/private within the Navy had include interservice
competition (public/public) and Congressional mandates which
serve to limit and expand competition.[Ref. 24]
C. CURRENT NAVY STRATEGY
NAVAIR's solution to the challenges of fully implementing
public/private competition within the NADEPs was the
development of a Naval Aviation Depot Industrial Strategy. In
January 1993, Vice Admiral Willliam Bowes, Commander, Naval
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Air Systems Command, tasked his command to meet with industry
representatives to "discuss concerns pertaining to
public/private competitions and organic industrial
workload."[Ref. 37] The result of those series of meetings
was the Naval Aviation Industrial Strategy published 13 April
1993. (The Strategy Concept Paper is included in this Thesis
at Appendix A) NAVAIR's strategy is summarized below:
(1) Define minimum core requirements
(2) Close excess depots as expeditiously as possible
(3) Rightsize the remaining depots to perform core work
(4) Offer non-core work to industry for competition
(5) Develop commercial contract performance guidelines
(6) Develop a long term plan which allows both the
NADEPs and industry to make long term strategic
decisions
(7) Implement this industrial strategy concurrent with
base closure and realignment decisions.[Ref. 37]
Additionally the strategy should:
(1) Result in an effective maintenance capability that
meets the readiness requirements of the fleet;
(2) Place a greater reliance for depot maintenance on
private industry, utilizing imbedded capability and
capacity;
(3) Be a consistent policy, allowing the Navy and
industry to plan for the future; and
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(4) Be a model Government-Industry relationship,
accomplishing the goals of both while serving the
best interest of the Nation.[Ref. 37]
During a recent meeting with industry representatives at
the Aerospace Industries Association Product Support Committee
Conference, Admiral Bowes reiterated NAVAIR's depot strategy.
He elaborated on the strategy by saying that rightsizing the
depots to perform only the core work necessary to maintain
personnel, facilities, and training needed for surge and
readiness requirements was his goal. Likewise, by closing
some depots and downsizing others, he could reduce his fixed
cost of his "depot corporation" and remove excess capability
that currently exists.[Ref. 38]
During that same presentation, Admiral Bowes explained the
core definition used when drafting the depot strategy and the
parameters on which it was based:
- A regional war scenario (5 carrier groups plus selected
Marine land-based aircraft)
- CNO aircraf- priority list
- Field team support of engaged aircraft
- Individual depot aircraft and engine trade skill
profiles
- No interservice workload considered
- Reviewed postured organic workload
- Considered single siting products strategy
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Aircraft/engine/component attrition rates based on
deployment projections
Presidential budget [Ref. 18]
As the strategy has been revised, a more deliberate algorithm
has been developed to test whether an
airframe/engine/component should be considered as part of the
core. Once weapon systems are identified as core, then an
analytic process is conducted which calculates the number of
core items which must be retained in the organic depots to
maintain personnel, facilities, and training levels to support
readiness requirements. [Ref. 38] The core capability will
vary with the aircraft, and is what's needed to retain
proficiency.[Ref. 28]
Further defining NAVAIR's depot strategy, NAVAIR officials
said that "work beyond the minimum required to maintain the
core capability will be awarded to industry but only if there
is more than one competitor." (Ref. 39] During a 21 June 1993
presentation of the strategy at NAVAIR Headquarters, Admiral
Bowes said,"If only one company is interested performing the
upgrade work, then the NADEPs will still compete with industry
to avoid awarding a sole-source contract."[Ref. 39]
In addition to the Naval Aviation Depot Industrial
Strategy, NAVAIR supported other initiatives designed to
formalize public/private competition. The most significant
has been the request for Defense Contract Management
Command(DCMC) participation as the administrative contracting
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activity for awards under public/private competition. [Ref. 18]
The new policy would not have a major impact on private sector
firms who have had considerable experience with DCMC. It
would, however, have a significant impact on public activities
that have relied on their own Service's administrative project
officers (APOs) for contract administration. [Ref. 12] Navy
officials cite the need for consistency in contract
administration and separation of NAVAIR officials from the
role of administrator of their own work assignment documents
as rationale for requesting DCMC participation.[Ref. 18]
Nevertheless, some NADEP officials prefer using the APOs
assigned by program managers over officials from outside the
Navy. [Ref. 12] Enthusiasm for this NAVAIR initiative is also
not shared by other Services who could be forced to utilize
DCMC services if mandated by DoD policy. (Refs. 35, 40, 41,and
42]
Another major initiative which NAVAIR has been supportive
of has been the formalization of public/private competition in
the form of a rule change to the Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement (DFARS). The rule change would
establish, by regulation, a separate section of the DFARS
dealing with this form of competition. It would contain all
the necessary clauses required in a solicitation peculiar to
public/private competition and establish common procedures for
the conduct of a competition. [Ref. 5] The proposed rule
change creating the new section of the DFARS has been revised
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numerous times, and, as of this writing, is still being
reviewed by the Defense Acquisition Regulations Council. [Ref.
18]
NAVAIR's policy towards implementation of public/private
competition has shifted from a commitment to increased
competition, immediately following the initial F-14 SDLM
award, to a new Naval Aviation Depot Industrial Strategy,
which de-emphasizes competition in favor of a core workload
retained by the NADEPs, while making all other workload
available for private/private competition. This new strategy
also represents NAVAIR's efforts to create a "model for
Government-Industry relationships, accomplishing the goals of
both while serving the best interest of the Nation."[Ref. 37]
NAVAIR public/private competition is influenced by
Congressional legislation, DoD policy, and by interservice
agreements. While the theme of this Thesis is NAVAIR policy,
it would be prudent to briefly discuss these other influences
in terms of their respective positions regarding
public/private competition. The following sections evaluate
the competition program from an interservice perspective,
Department of Defense perspective and lastly a congressional
perspective.
D. INTERSERVICE PERSPECTIVE
The interservice perspective will briefly examine
public/private competition for aircraft overhaul, repair, or
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modification from a U.S. Army (USA) and U.S. Air Force (USAF)
point of view. As all U.S. Marine Corps aviation assets are
controlled by NAVAIR, they are assumed to be included in the
NAVAIR totals. [Ref. 1] As the Service-unique positions are
described, certain similarities to NAVAIR policies may become
apparent, and significant differences will become obvious.
The purpose of this section is only to identify other Service
perspectives, and not to make detailed comparisons between
NAVAIR and Army or Air Force policies.
On 27 October 1993, Major General John S. Cowlings, USA,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Aviation and Troop Command,
addressed the AIA Product Support Committee Conference and
provided the Army's perspective on public/private competition.
Summarizing his comments, he said the Army's fiscal objective
is to move as much workload as possible into the Government-
owned depots. Specifically, in 1991 the organic or depot
workload for rotary wing aircraft (helicopters) as a
percentage of total workload was 48 percent (52 percent of the
workload was contracted to private firms. By 1997, the Army
plans to boost the organic workload to 67 percent. While less
and less rotary wing workload is being competed with the
private sector, the Army plans to have 100 percent of its
fixed wing aircraft requirements met by contracts with private
activities. Major General Cowlings cited his own depot excess
capacity, Army divestiture of aircraft (500 a year), and other
fiscal impacts as reasons for reducing the need for additional
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depot support. The most important reason for maintaining a
larger percentage of organic workload over contracted workload
was Congressionally-imposed limitations on the amount of Army
aviation workload that could be awarded competitively under
public/private competition.[Ref. 43] Under the 1993 Defense
Appropriations Act, 50 percent of all Army aviation depot work
was to be done by DoD employees with the percentages
increasing to 55 percent in 1994 and 60 percent in 1995.[Ref.
33] Given those requirements and the "reshaping of the Army,"
General Cowlings said that the Army does not plan to offer any
more programs up for public/private competition.[Ref. 43]
The Army's policy to not seek additional competition is
markedly different from the Air Force as presented at the AIA
Product Support Committee Conference. During that conference,
two Air Force General Officers spoke on the issue of
public/private competition and the Air Force's approach to
managing this form of competition.[Refs. 44 and 45] The Air
Forces's position on public/private competition within the
Materiel Commands, including the Air Logistics Centers (ALCs),
is that the Air Force will sustain organic Air Force depots by
competing all workloads with other Services and with private
industry. [Ref. 45] Major General Lester L. Lyles, USAF,
Commander, Ogden Air Logistics Center, considers competition
(both public/public " public/private) to be the only means
to effectively downsize depots while maximizing existing
plant, equipment, personnel, and training resources. [Ref. 45]
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Major General Lewis Curtis III, USAF, Commander, San Antonio
Air Logistics Center, added that the Air Force would
aggressively seek to compete with the other Services and
private industry. [Ref. 44]
The Air Forces's involvement in public/private competition
was approximately 4 percent in 1991, and by 1993 had grown to
approximately 40 percent.[Ref. 45] Both Air Force Generals
noted that their Service's Air Logistics Centers were very
competitive and that out of a total 28 competitions on which
the Centers bid, they won 19. [Ref. 45] It should be noted
however, that the individual ALC Commanders currently select
the programs that will be competed. [Ref. 45] The possibility
of bias in program selection is similar to that identified by
the GAO in NAVAIR's initial competition program.[Ref. 3]
The Air Force representatives agreed on several
conclusions and recommendations for public/private
competition. First, they concluded that competition has been
disruptive and destructive both internally and externally. It
has created hostility between the ALC depot corporations and
the aeparate source selection authority (SSA) located at the
same ALC.[Ref. 44] General Curtis complained that following
a competition, it would take seven to eight months to rebuild
working relationships between his depot and the offices that
served as the SSA. He also illustrated his point by saying
that public/private competition has destroyed former teaming
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relationships external to his conmmand such as those that
existed between the Air Force and Lockheed.[Ref. 44]
A second conclusion was that the DoD Cost Comparability
H was an excellent tool for adjusting proposals
submitted by both private and public activities. General Lyles
did concede that inherent differences did remain, and both
Generals agreed that existing ALC financial systems are not
set up to capture cost to the same degree that industry is
required. [Ref. 44]
A third conclusion was that the original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs) would never be in a position to compete
against the depots and win.[Ref. 44] Specifically, the OEMs
can provide design, development, engineering, and
manufacturing capability, but currently lack adequate
maintenance capability. Design, engineering, and even
manufacturing are not the same as maintenance and overhaul
work.[Ref. 44] Both Generals agreed that because the large
OEMs are burdened by design, development, and engineering
overhead, they are not competitive against the ALCs or even
smaller specialized maintenance service companies.[Refs. 44
and 45]
A final Air Force conclusion is that public/private
competition is not the solution to defense industrial base
concerns. Industrial base considerations are separate from
public/private competition issues, which focus only on
improving the efficiency of depot maintenance by creating
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market forces similar to those which exist in the private
sector.[Ref. 45]
Given the conclusions presented to the AIA Conference
attendees, Air Force officials have only two recommendations:
(1) To ensure greater competition, core workload should
be zero, with everything available for competition.
(2) To effectively change the public/private competition
program, the involvement of the Secretary of Defense
is required.[Ref. 44]
While the Army and Air Force perspectives on
public/private competition differ from one another and from
NAVAIR's Depot Strategy, they are relevant because they can
have an impact on NAVAIR competition as will be seen in the
next Chapter in the discussion of the F-18 MCAPP competition.
Z. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSPECTIVE
The second Air Force recommendation listed in the
preceding section advocated DoD involvement when changing the
public/private competition program. As this section will
illustrate, DoD has become increasingly involved in the
competition program. Because of the implications of DoD
policy on NAVAIR public/private competition, a brief review of
policy initiatives and program changes will be presented in
the following paragraphs.
During the AIA Conference referred to in the preceding
sections, two Department of Defense representatives spoke on
the current DoD/OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense)
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position on public/private competition. The Honorable Mr.
James Klugh, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics
and Captain (Select) Colleen Watry, USN, Maintenance Policy
Office, OSD, both provided similar presentations listing their
respective offices' conclusions and recommendations regarding
the competition program.
The following conclusions were discussed in considerable
detail at the AIA Conference but are listed here in a
summarized format:
(1) Depots on closure lists (NADEP Norfolk, NADEP
Pensacola, and NADEP Alameda among others)should not
be awarded workloads.
(2) Each Service will continue to define its core
workload subject to evaluation by OSD.
(3) Public/private competition is beneficial because it
eliminates inefficiency.
(4) Public/private competition can be damaging because
it does not foster cooperation, disrupts the private
sector, and leads to overall poor relationships
between Government and industry.
(5) DoD Cost Comparability Handbook is as complete as
possible. It can not include the true burden rate
of owning depots.
(6) Accounting system deficiencies exist and the systems
vary between Services.
(7) Excess capacity exists in both public and private
sectors. Both sectors' excess capacity should be
reduced. [Ref. 46]
Among the DOD's recommendations for improving the
effectiveness of public/private competition were:
(1) Reduce excess capacity within the sectors
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(2) Formulate a department-wide definition of core
workload
(3) Increase interservicing of workloads
(4) Integrate public and private sectors capabilities
- private sector operation of Government depots
- commercial use of Government depots
(5) Adopt commercial business practices to the maximum
extent practicable which would lead to a smaller
infrastructure
(6) Modify Congressional legislation especially that
which imposes limitations on competition.
(7) Create a DoD/Industry task force to review depot
competition
(8) Empower the Defense Depot Maintenance Council (DDMC)
to manage depot competition
(9) Define a DoD competition strategy.[Refs. 46 and 47]
The impact of some of the DoD recommendations on NAVAIR
policy would be minimal, because NAVAIR has already
incorporated those recommendations into its Naval Aviation
Depot Industrial Strategy. [Ref. 38] One recommendation which
could have a more direct impact on NAVAIR efforts is the
empowerment of the Defense Depot Maintenance Council (DDMC).
The DDMC's original structure provided "limited cross-service
control. of depot maintenance business decisions .... The
result has been great difficulty in making substantial changes
in depot capacity and business processes."(Ref. 48] The
concept of an "empowered" DDMC calls for expanded authority
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which would allow it to be the mechanism for defining core
workloads, level of competition, capacity, and the degree of
cross-servicing.[Ref. 47] The DDMC organization approved by
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. William Perry, would be
headed by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics
with a director to manage routine operations.[Ref. 47] The
empowered DDMC is not a new command or agency like that
proposed by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Collin Powell.[Ref. 47] That plan, which had
considerable top level military support [Ref. 49], would have
merged all depots into a single command, but was rejected by
Defense Secretary Les Aspin.[Ref. 50] According to DoD
officials, the empowered DDMC centralizes management of
Defense Depot operations while relying on decentralized
execution and existing infrastructure.[Ref. 47]
Other DoD recommendations rely on Congressional action for
implementation. Most, in fact, are reportedly included in the
forthcoming FY 1994 Defense Appropriations legislation.[Ref.
18] Certainly any Congressional legislation affecting
public/private competition will have an impact on the NAVAIR
program. It is, therefore, appropriate to review
public/private competition from a Congressional perspective.
F. CONGRESSIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Congressional involvement in the public/private
competition program has been extensive and controversial. [Ref.
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51] Some DoD officials believe that Congress' involvement has
restricted their ability to manage the program (Ref. 50] while
industry is critical of the Congress' protection of the
depots.[Ref. 52]
Congress authorized public/private competition for the
maintenance of Naval aircraft in fiscal year 1987.[Ref. 2]
Since then, Congress has expanded competition to other weapon
systems and provided for competition between service depots in
an effort to maximize efficiencies resulting from
competition. (Ref. 34] As the competition program grew,
Congress began to curtail the level of competition by capping
the amount of depot work that could be awarded to private
firms at 40 percent. [Ref. 52] Congress singled out Army
aviation depot maintenance in the 1993 Defense Authorization
Act by mandating that at least 50 percent of all Army aviation
depot work be done by DoD employees. That percentage is
scheduled to increase to 55 percent in 1994 and 60 percent in
1995. (Ref. 33]
This apparent shift in emphasis from encouraging
competition in early legislation to placing caps on the
percent of depot work that can be awarded to the private
sector is largely the result of a strong bipartisan depot
maintenance caucus. [Ref. 52] When Defense Secretary Les Aspin
conducted his own "bottom-up review" of the Defense
Department, he agreed with industry that the private sector
should receive most of the depot maintenance work. The 108
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member depot caucus reacted by inserting language into the
House Defense Authorization Bill barring the Secretary from
transferring depot work to the private sector. (Ref. 52] Other
depot policy shifts in DoD have also met with strong
opposition from Congress.(Ref. 50]
The depot caucus represents the political and constituent
forces at work in the Congress. For example, in the House of
Representatives, military depots have been strongly supported
by members such as Congressman Ronald Dellums (D-CA), Chairman
of the House Armed Services Committee who lost several depots
in the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process in 1993 and
could lose another in BRAC 1995. Another depot supporter and
head of the depot caucus is Representative Glen Browder (D-AL)
who wants to protect his District's Anniston Army Depot. [Ref.
52]
The most current effort within the house of
Representatives was the inclusion of language in the House
version of the Defense Appropriations Act that would "create
a Joint Industry/Government panel to study how the repair and
overhaul business could be shared between depots and
industry." The panel's report is expected to be published in
mid-1994 followed by a series of Congressional hearings on the
subject. [Ref. 52] The panel or task force would be set up to
determine:
(1) Which maintenance work must be performed by
Government employees, and which should be done in
the private sector.
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(2) Which work could be offered to either Defense
Department depots or private industry on a
competitive basis.
(3) How a standard might be set for comparing the
quality and cost of work at different
activities.[Ref. 53]
Congressional support for public/private competition of
depot maintenance functions has changed significantly from its
early demands for more competition and greater cost savings to
its current policy of restricting private sector awards to 40
percent of a Service's depot workload. FY 94 legislation
continues a trend of stricter regulations which limit private
sector participation. [Ref. 47] Future legislation and policy
shifts in Congress will continue to have a significant impact
on the NADEPs and NAVAIR's depot industrial strategy.
Congress' desire to create a joint industry/Government panel
and subsequent hearings on the depot question could result in
a definitized national policy for depot competition.
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has provided a Government perspective to the
evaluation of public/private competition. The chapter first
reviewed the Navy's initial strategy for conducting
public/private competition and the problems which followed the
early awards. The second section introduced the current Navy
strategy which embodies the NAVAIR Depot Industrial strategy
concept paper. The changing strategy represents a significant
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shift in the Navy and in particular, NAVAIR's perspective of
the competition program. The third section provided the
reader with an interservice perspective to illustrate the
similarities and differences between the Services in their
attitudes and policies toward public/private competition. The
fourth section evaluated the program from a DoD perspective.
Department officials recognized that differences existed
between the Services, and that any Department-wide policy
could significantly alter a Service's own competition program.
Many of the DoD recommendations for improving the conduct of
public/private competition would require Congressional
approval. The final section of the chapter discussed the
current Congressional perspective of public/private
competition. The section emphasized the political aspects of
any Congressional action but pointed out Congress' willingness
to address the issue through the formulation of a joint
industry/Government panel to investigate and report program
recommendations.
Any DoD wide or Congressional action will impact on the
way public/private competition is conducted in the NADEPs.
The individual Services have significant differences in their
implementation of the competition program. Any move to create
a single policy for all Services, whether through a new
command or empowered Defense Depot Maintenance Council could
also impact significantly on NAVAIR's own competitive
strategy.
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The following chapter will analyze and evaluate the
recommendations provided in this chapter against criteria such
as budgetary constraints, manpower limitations, and political
reality.
68
V. EVALUATION OF RECOhlENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will evaluate the reconmendations described
above against criteria such as budgetary constraints,
industrial base considerations, and political reality.
Recommendations which do not directly impact public/private
competition are considered beyond the scope of this Thesis.
They will, however, be identified for purposes of continuity.
This chapter will begin by comparing two competition programs,
the F-14 SDLM and the F-18 MCAPP, to determine to what extent
NAVAIR initiatives for improving public/private competition
have been implemented in this most recent competition.
Lessons learned from this comparison will be included in the
evaluation of industry and Government recommendations.
B. COMPARISON OF F-14 SDLM AND F-18 MCAPP COMPETITIONS
Chapter II provided considerable background data on the F-
14 SDLM competition and refered to numerous audits and reviews
which were critical of the program. These audits and reviews,
most notably the GAO report, contained a number of
recommendations for enhancing public/private competition
effectiveness and efficiency. Chapter II also described how
NAVAIR, NADOC, and the NADEPs aggressively sought to implement
many of those recommendations with varying degrees of
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success. How have the GAO reconmmendations and NAVAIR's own
initiatives for improving public/private competitions been
applied to another major depot competition? A comparison with
the F-18 MCAPP competition and subsequent award will help
answer the question.
The F-18 MCAPP (Modification, Corrosion, and Paint
Program) solicitation was issued on 11 May 1992, with all
proposals due to NAVAIR by 10 July 1992. The solicitation
called for the inspection, repair, and/or modification of a
number of F-18 aircraft with provisions for over and above
work. Specifically, the aircraft would be inducted by lots,
with expected quantities ranging from 72 aircraft (lot I) to
31 aircraft (lot V). [Ref. 54] The types of work prescribed in
the solicitation, overhaul and repair of discrepancies, was
very similar to that prescribed in the F-14 solicitation.
Here, however, the similarity ends.
As Chapter II pointed out, the F-14 SDLM was NAVAIR's
first major public/private competition program. It proceeded
without an acquisition strategy, without a system for
comparability analysis, and without a system of contract
administration. Virtually all of these shortcomings were
corrected in the F-18 competition. First, considerable effort
was put into acquisition planning and developing a strategy
for accomplishing the competition. [Ref. 18] These efforts
included the drafting and subsequent revisions to the NAVAIR
Instruction 4200.35, "Competition Between Public Activities
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and Private Offerors," and the development of the work
assignment document (WAD). NAVAIR also separated those
individuals involved in proposal preparation from those
involved in source selection, and required all participants to
sign procurement integrity certifications. In addition to
these steps, NAVAIR also pursued the involvement of outside
acLLvities including the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)
and the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) to further
strengthen the competition program.
NAVAIR took additional steps to place the NADEPs and
private industry on an equal footing by implementing and
requiring cost comparability and cost realism analysis in all
public/private competitions. Prior to the F-18 MCAPP, NAVAIR
was successful in involving the DCAA in the certification
process for cost realism and comparability. The Defense
Appropriateness Act for 1993 required DCAA to certify that
successful bids on competitions contain estimates of
comparable costs.[Ref. 55] DCAA memorandum 93-OPD-O11(R),
which became effective 25 January 1993, implemented the
requirements of the Appropriations Act. The memorandum
requires public depots to use the Cost Comparability Handbook
in conjunction with the DoD Accounting Manual, the Cost
Accounting Standards, and Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP). Additionally the memo states that:
If cost or pricing data is not adequate or the
proposal was not prepared in accordance with the Cost
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Comparability Handbook, the proposal is unacceptable for
evaluation by the requester.[Ref. 55]
The requirement for DCAA certification is now applicable to
all competitions involving public activities, extending its
application beyond NAVAIR public/private competitions.
Another initiative that NAVAIR pursued, and eventually was
successful in implementing, was the utilization of DCMC
activities in the administration of public/private awards.
The utilization of DCMC, vice a NAVAIR Administrative Project
Officer for awards to the NADEPs, is an effort to further
level the playing field by ensuring that an arms length
relationship exists between the requiring activity, NAVAIR,
and the contract administration activity. The F-18 MCAPP
solicitation provides that the NAVAIR Procuring Contracting
Officer (PCO) designate the contract administration activity.
[Ref. 54] NAVAIR has stipulated that DCMC will perform
contract administration functions regardless of who is the
successful offeror.[Ref. 56]
The F-18 competition seems to have incorporated all of the
lessons learned from the F-14 SDLM competition. Attached to
the F-18 solicitation are questions and answers to the draft
RFP discussed during a 10 February 1992, pre-solicitation
conference. In response to one question regarding lessons
learned from the F-14 competition, NAVAIR answered that
"...the lessons learned will be incorporated into the
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competitive contracting process, including post award
administration."[Ref. 54]
Although considerable effort was expended, and steps taken
to ensure the fairness of the competition, the F-18 award has
highlighted additional issues yet to be resolved. The award
was announced in mid-August 1993, over a year after the
closing date for RFPs and following a series of delays.[Ref.
18] Ogden Air Logistics Center (ALC), an Air Force aircraft
depot, received the award in what actually turned out to be a
public/private/public competition. Ogden's proposal was
"significantly" lower than the major private sector entrant,
Grumman Aerospace, St. Augustine, Florida; and lower than
NAVAIR's North Island NADEP.[Ref. 56] Grumman's displeasure
with the award was immediately transmitted to its principal
lobbying organization, the Aerospace Industries
Association. [Ref. 16] NADEP North Island initially protested
the award but subsequently decided to withdraw its
protest.[Ref. 56]
While preparing for the F-18 competition, NAVAIR focused
on implementing improvements that would ensure that every
phase of the acquisition process would be fair for both
private sector firms and for the NADEPs. The Air Force's
aggressive competition program introduced issues that had not
been fully considered. For example, NAVAIR requested that
DCMC manage all contract administration functions for any
contract or work assignment document awarded in public/private
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competition. The Air Force, however, does not want DCMC
administering workload in its facilities. [Ref. 45] NAVAIR was
aware of the Air Force's objection to DCMC involvement and
discussed the topic with Air Force officials throughout late
1992 and early 1993.[Ref. 41] In fact, when the issue was
first raised in mid-1991, General Charles McDonald, USAF,
Con•mander, Air Force Logistics Command, wrote the Director,
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) citing his concerns.[Ref. 40]
Instead of utilizing DCMC services, the Air Logistics Centers
(ALCs) prefer to use their own administrative project officers
for contract administration. Of course NAVAIR's rationale for
requesting DCMC support was to avoid the appearance of less
than an arms-length relationship between the activity
performing the work and the activity monitoring compliance.
The Air Force's objections to DCMC participation and desire to
utilize Air Force personnel to administer the award to an ALC
is a return to the very policy that NAVAIR was attempting to
avoid.
In the instant case of the F-18, the Ogden ALC Commander
has submitted a request to the Commander, Naval Air Systems
Command, asking that Air Force APOs be utilized vice
DCMC. [Ref. 45] Additionally, Ogden ALC is continuing efforts
outside the Navy to have the F-18 workload executed and
administered under the guidelines established in the Depot
Maintenance Interservicing Support Agreement (DMISA) vice any
contract or work assignment document (WAD). [Ref. 45] The
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DMISA provides for administration of workloads using project
orders when work has been assigned to another service's depot
facilities. The WAD requirements are much more rigorous and
detailed and more similar to a contract awarded to a private
activity than those required in the DMISA. As of this
writing, no decision has been made on the Air Force request,
but a post-award conference is scheduled for November 1993.
It is certain that both NADEP North Island and Grumman are
watching the events closely for actions wnich could provide a
basis for protests.
This brief compar .son of the F-14 and F-18 competitions
has provided some insight into the effort expended by NAVAIR
to improve public/private competition. The process much more
closely resembles a true competition, embracing the
requirements, clauses and procedures found in privat./private
competitions. The F-18 competition also demonstrated that in
a situation of public/private/public competition, NAVAIR
procedures may be insufficient to deal with the challenges of
awarding a work assignment document, a NAVAIR creation, to an
Air Force or other public activity.
C. EVALUATION OF INDUSTRY RECOMMENDATIONS
Chapter III described, in detail, industry recommendations
concerning public/private competition. That list of
recommendations, along with industry's conclusions concerning
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the competition program, can be grouped together in such a way
as to provide three general recommendations:
1. The Department of Defense must identify what core
workload is required to support facility, personnel
training, and equipment readiness for surge operations
and all other work should be assigned to the private
sector for competition.
2. The Department of Defense must address the inadequacies
of the Cost Comparability Handbook to ensure that bids
are in fact comparable between the public and private
sectors.
3. The Department of Defense must recognize that
"competition between public and private sectors is
fundamentally inconsistent with free market principles."
And therefore, there needs to be a "National policy
designed to further the viability and competitiveness of
the entire aerospace industry."[Ref. 25]
This grouping does not imply that the recommendations are
inconsistent with one another. In fact, NAVAIR has attempted
to respond to each of these recommendations in its Naval
Aviation Depot Industrial Strategy introduced in Chapter IV.
The three recommendations cited above are, in the opinion
of the researcher, fully consistent with the evaluation
parameters of industrial base considerations, political
reality, and budgetary constraints. Industry recognizes the
need to maintain a strong industrial base, capable of meeting
defense and commercial needs. Comments by industry
representatives at the Aerospace Industries Association
Conference suggested that excess capacity does exist in both
public and private sectors. They also agreed that downsizing
in the private sector must take place, but that downsizing
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should occur at least as quickly in the public sector as it
does in the private sector.[Ref. 57]
The first recommendation supports the view that depots are
a legitimate part of the industrial base, although they should
not be the major portion of that base. Most industry
representatives conceded that the NADEPs did provide a unique
service to Naval Aviation, particularity in the area of
peculiar shipboard operations, corrosion, and crash damage.
These special areas, and the need to maintain a surge
capability, represent industry's view of what "core" workload
is. Again, this definition is consistent with the depot
strategy announced by Admiral Bowes in April 1993.
Industry's desire to have a "core" defined by OSD also
supports the fact that defense spending is declining rapidly.
By identifying what work will be retained in the depots,
industry can make management decisions regarding capacity and
capability requirements, and rid themselves of excess or
underutilized capacity, a growing portion of overhead costs.
Likewise, depots will also be in a better position to identify
facilities for closure or realignment.
The emphasis on core workload, and industry's desire for
DoD to define that core, becomes problematic when the analysis
considers political reality. The strength of the "Depot
Caucus" identified in earlier chapters is based on its members
desires to retain depot activities in their constituent
districts. The caucus has supported legislation which imposes
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a requirement to have at least sixty percent of all depot work
completed by DoD employees. Fiscal year 1994 legislation is
reported to contain further restrictions, by specific
commodity, (aircraft, engines, vessels, trucks, etc) which
will further reduce the overall percentages of items available
for competition to under thirty-five percent. [Ref. 47] An
additional problem with defining core workload is that there
are differences of opinion among the Services as to what work
should be considered unavailable for competition. For
example, NAVAIR supports a somewhat narrow view with most
traditional depot work available for competition.[Ref 38] On
the other hand, the Air Force prefers "zero" core, with all
work available for public/private/public competition. These
conflicting positions will have to be reconciled if DoD is to
embrace industry's recommendation for an established and
defined core.
Industry's second broad recommendation is that DoD must
address the inadequacies of the Cost Comparability Handbook.
The effects of political reality, budgetary constraints, and
industrial base considerations, on this recommendation are not
major factors. The issue of cost comparability and the
difficulty in developing and applying adjustment factors to
public bids is recognized by both industry and OSD.[Refs. 45
and 47]
The Handbook was first drafted in November 1991 and has
undergone numerous revisions since then. The most recent
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edition, August 1993, is cited by industry as still containing
serious flaws which provide public activities with an
unsurmountable advantage.[Ref. 57] Likewise, some military
officials, among them Major General Lyles, Ogden ALC, believe
that cost comparability can not be further refined and the
inherent differences between the public and private sectors
will remain.[Ref. 45]
Industry has recommended that there should be greater
private sector involvement in developing adjustment factors
applied in the Handbook. [Ref. 31] According to DoD officials,
a Joint Industry/Government Task Force will be established by
FY 94 legislation and that one of the major issues to
addressed by the task force will be cost comparability. [Ref.
46]
The third broad recommendation posed by industry is the
need for a national policy which supports the "viability and
competitiveness" of the aerospace industry. [Ref. 25] The call
for a national policy implies that Congressional legislative
action is required, which is beyond the scope of either the
Services or OSD. This is essentially a question of to what
degree should efforts be expended to support an industry
business base, at least defense business base, which is
declining rapidly. Chapter I suggested that industrial base
issues were beyond the scope of this paper, as the issue is
much more complex and too unwieldy for this Thesis. It is
sufficient to point out that when the issue of the Defense
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Industrial Base is considered, the public depots must be
included as an integral element of the base.
The three industry recommendations listed above represent
a synthesis of a number of recommendations put forward by
industry spokesmen and associations. There is general
agreement among the various firms and trade associations on
what must be done to improve public/private competition. This
type of cohesion does not exist among the Services. As a
result, Service recommendations represent differing views and
priorities relative to public/private competition. The
following section will evaluate Service recommendations
against the same criteria used in the analysis of industry
recommendations.
D. EVALUATION OF SERVICE RECOMMENDATIONS
The information provided in the preceeding chapter
indicates that the two most divergent positions among the
Services exist between the Navy and the Air Force. The Army's
position relative to aviation depot maintenance is that they
are trying to move more rotary wing work back into the depots
to meet Congressionally mandated requirements specific to the
Army.[Ref. 43] As was mentioned at the outset, Marine Corps
aviation requirements are included in NAVAIR requirements. On
one extreme, the Air Force has as its goal 100 percent
competition, with no core reserved for Service depots. [Ref.44]
This policy, the Air Force contends, provides the most
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effective technique to downsize both public and private
facilities by identifying the most efficient through
competition.[Ref. 45] The Air Force also views aggressive
competition with industry and other Service depots as the
primary means to sustain their organic depots.[Ref. 45] It
should be noted that this view does not have unanimous support
in the Air Force.[Ref. 58] At one particular ALC, the
Commander viewed competition as disruptive and expensive, and
recommended that OSD involvement was required to change the
public/private competition program.[Ref. 44]
The other extreme position is held by the Navy, and
specifically NAVAIR. NAVAIR's position was described in
detail in Chapter IV but summarizing it here: NAVAIR prefers
to limit its involvement in public/private competition by
defining a core workload for its NADEPs and making all other
work available for competition within private firms. The
NADEPs would compete against a private firm only if there was
a sole source situation.[Ref. 37] NAVAIR's position is that
the NADEPs are no longer a "growth industry" and that NAVAIR
seeks and is encouraging a stronger partnership with
industry. [Ref. 56] These objectives are clearly distinct and
distant from those offered by the Air Force.
The two Services do, however, have one recommendation in
common, and that is that OSD involvement is required to change
the program. From an Air Force perspective, that means
eliminating the necessity for determining core workload, and
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allowing competition to determine which depot facilities
should be nominated for closure or realignment. From a NAVAIR
perspective, that means applying a standard definition of core
workload to all Services, eliminating Congressionally mandated
percentages of work available for competition, and introducing
DoD-wide policy on public/private competition that creates
commonality among the Services in their dealings with
industry.
Although the Air Force has pointed out that aircraft
design, engineering, and production are not necessarily
compatible with aircraft maintenance and overhaul[Ref. 44],
there are enough similarities that the private sector should
be considered for some of this work. Industry also contends
that the overhaul and modification work made available to
them would sustain their facilities and personnel skills until
such time that aircraft production was again available. It
would seem that the best approach to downsizing would involve
identifying core workload necessary for the depots to maintain
readiness levels to support special and surge operations,
while allowing private industry to compete for all other
workload. It does not support an approach such as that
followed by the Air Force which requires further
capitalization in the face of universally accepted excess
capacity in both industry and the depots.[Ref. 27]
The Air Force policy also must be evaluated against
budgetary constraints. The expenditures of declining defense
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appropriations to expand industrial capacity within DoD when
facilities already exist in the private sector to accomplish
the work, suggests an inefficient use of the funds. The
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) generally has the
tooling, facilities, and equipment necessary to complete the
work, but only after considerable reorganization. If a sole
source situation results from relying on an OEM for
maintenance support, then other contracting or pricing and
costing techniques are available to reduce the strength of the
OEM's sole source position. NAVAIR has said that it will
compete only when there is a sole source and only to invoke
competitive pressure to achieve the best value to the
Government. [Ref. 37]
One final point on Air Force policy. The Air Force's
acceptance of the condition that cost comparability remains
flawed, undermines their position that competition achieved
through public/private identifies the most efficient
facilities and, therefore, others should be singled out for
closure or realignment. If cost comparability were adequate,
this conclusion would be acceptable. But, if it is not
adequate, as virtually everyone agrees, no conclusions as to
an activity's efficiency can be drawn between public and
private sector facilities.
NAVAIR policy, announced in April 1993 as the Naval
Aviation Depot Industrial Strategy, is considered by many in
industry to be the most positive step in balancing NAVAIR and
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industry views. [Ref. 51] When evaluated against criteria such
as industrial base considerations and budgetary constraints,
the NAVAIR strategy scores highly. When evaluated against
political reality, it does less well. The 108 member Depot
Caucus has pursued policies which retain the majority of
workloads in the military depots. Attempts to go below the
sixty percent mandated in prior year legislation is unlikely.
However, NAVAIR was successful in reducing what it considered
to be excess capacity, when it nominated three of its six
depots for closure during the Base Realignment And Closure
(BRAC) Commission hearings in FY 93.
The NAVAIR policy has more closely resembled and
complemented industry than any other Service's policy. But,
as the F-18 MCAPP competition has shown, it will be necessary
to reconcile divergent positions, such as those held by the
Navy and industry on one hand, and the Air Force on the other.
A unified or common policy could be implemented in a number of
ways. DoD representatives recommended the empowerment of the
Defense Depot Maintenance Council (DDMC) and the creation of
a Joint Industry/Government Task Force to address
public/private competition. These recommendations will be
discussed in the next section. NAVAIR has drafted a proposed
rule change to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement (DFARS) to establish a single DoD-wide set of
guidelines governing public/private competition. [Ref. 18] The
proposed DFARS part is included as Appendix B to this paper.
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The original draft rule change has been modified considerably
since it was first proposed, and other Services have been
provided an opportunity to evaluate the proposal and challenge
provisions contained therein. The latest version of the draft
rule being circulated for comments was assigned DFARS Case
number 92-D355, and has undergone major changes since NAVAIR's
first draft. The proposal is still pending as of this
writing. Indications from NAVAIR representatives are that if
the proposal is approved as now written, it will not meet
their initial objectives for the rule change. [Ref. 37]
The Services' recommendations described above must be
implemented at OSD, or higher levels because, as the F-18
competition has shown, private/public competition has become
public/private/public competition with multi-Service
participation. The evolutionary change in the program
necessitates a policy and direction which will not only ensure
that fair treatment is given to public and private entities,
but that one set of standards and procedures will be equally
applied among the Services. An evaluation of DoD
recommendations is the subject of the following section.
E. EVALUATION OF DOD RECOMMENDATIONS
In an attempt to better understand the issues associated
with public/private competition, and to answer Service,
industry, and Congressional concerns, OSD has recommended two
major initiatives. The first is the empowerment of the
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Defense Depot Maintenance Council (DDMC). This recommendation
was detailed in Chapter IV, but briefly, it calls for
centralized management of all Defense depots through the
issuance of standard policies and procedures. The DDMC would
rely on decentralized execution through each of the Services,
and, according to officials of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), would utilize existing infrastructure, and not
be a new "purple suit" command. (Ref. 47] The DDMC, made up of
representatives from all the Services, would report to the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics (DUSD (L)).
Specifically, the DDMC would formulate guidelines for
individual Services to determine their core workload
requirements, define a DoD competition strategy, work towards
reducing excess capacity, and expand depot
interservicing. [Ref. 47]
The recommendation for an empowered DDMC addresses what
has, thus far been a weakness of public/private competition,
the fact that there is no single standard for this form of
competition throughout DoD. Air Force policies differ
significantly from NAVAIR's, and industry must adjust to
whichever Service is the requiring Service. In instances such
as the F-18 MCAPP, a single set of regulations and procedures
applicable to all Services and the private sector would
facilitate maintenance of a level playing field for all
concerned.
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This recommendation recognizes the need to consider the
industrial base, and the DUSD(L) recently confirmed his
recognition of the need to support a downsized, yet effective
depot industrial base. [Ref. 46] The recommendation also does
not require additional resources, which was a major cause of
the rejection of General Powell's plan for a new command to
manage all Service depots. [Ref. 60] By emphasizing
centralized management and decentralized execution, the DDMC
would utilize existing personnel, facilities, and management
information systems.
An empowered DDMC is not in place. There is likely to be
some Service opposition to such a plan wherein individual
Services relinquish some policy control to a council of
representatives from all Services. [Ref. 56] The politi-al
aspects of DDMC are unclear. Policies which hurt Depot Caucus
member constituents are likely to be vetoed through
legislation, while other initiatives could be fully supported.
The future of an empowered DDMC is opaque, but the need for a
standard DoD policy on competition is becoming increasingly
clear.
The second major initiative recommended by DoD is the
establishment of a Joint Industry/Government DoD Task Force to
discuss and make recommendations concerning public/private
competition and industrial base issues. [Ref. 46] Reportedly,
the FY-94 Defense Authorization Act formalizes this
recommendation, and requires the Secretary of Defense to
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establish the Task Force to assess the program's overall
performance. Additionally, the Task Force will be required to
report its findings to Congress by 1 April 1994. This
initiative could be the first step in a series to develop a
DoD wide policy on public/private competition zhat, at last,
considers industry and multi-Service perspectives.
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has focused on the recommendations made by
industry, the Services, and DoD regarding public/private
competition. The recommendations represented divergent views
on how best to proceed under this form of competition and
different philosophies on the roles of public depots. In the
evaluation of those recommendations it became apparent that
the Naval Aviation Depot Industrial Strategy more closely
resembled industry's view of public/private competition. The
Air Force's recommendations were ba3ed on the belief that
total competition would identify the most efficient depots,
whether public or private, and that others should be
eliminated. The fallacy in this argument was discussed as was
the issue of continued capitalization while excess capacity
exists in both the public and private sectors. Finally, the
chapter examined DoD's recommendations for standardizing and
improving the competition program. The F-14 SDLM and F-18
MCAPP comparison, which began the chapter, highlighted the
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need for a standard policy for all Services, which addresses
public/private as well as public/private/public competitions.
Given the foregoing evaluation, and after having
researched the topic of public/private competition for some
months, this researcher has drawn several conclusions, and has
formulated a few recommendations for those entrusted with
developing policy in this area. These topics will be the
basis for the concluding chapter of this Thesis.
89
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOaEMUDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The preceding chapters introduced the subject of
public/private competition in the NADEPs, and the challenges
that NAVAIR faced while implementing this relatively new form
of competition. They also detailed various industry and
Government recommendations for improving the conduct of
public/private competition. The previous chapter analyzed
those recommendations against such evaluation criteria as
industrial base considerations, budgetary constraints, and
political reality. This chapter concludes with a review of
the primary and subsidiary research questions and closes with
the researcher's own conclusions and recommendations.
B. REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question for the Thesis asked to what
extent has public versus private competition within the NADEPs
been effective, and what future strategies should be employed
to achieve greater effectiveness. That question was supported
by five subsidiary questions.
1. What is the definition and purpose of public versus
private competition?
2. How.has public versus private competition been applied
to the NADEPs?
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3. Have the public versus private competitions met the
goals of the program's original intent or purpose?
4. What impediments exist to full and effective
implementation of public versus competition?
5. What future strategies should be employed to enhance
program effectiveness?
Questions 1, 2, and 3 were answered in Chapters I and II,
where public/private competition was defined as a form of
competition in which Government or public activities competed
against private (commercial) firms for work that had
traditionally been accomplished in public depots. The purpose
of public/private competition was to utilize the forces of the
competitive marketplace to improve efficiency in the NADEPs,
and award workload to the activity that provided the best
value to the Government. Chapter II provided indepth
background into the implementation of public/private
competition in the NADEPs, and identified a number of issues
which adversely impacted on the success of the program. The
chapter also detailed early efforts to correct program
deficiencies, relying heavily on GAO recommendations.
In answering question four, the researcher elected to
evaluate program effectiveness from an industry perspective
and from a Government perspective. This was the subject of
Chapters III and IV. A rather homogeneous industry
perspective emerged which challenged the general fairness of
competitions, and placed considerable emphasis on what it
considered inadequate cost comparability between the sectors.
91
Chapter III concluded with industry recommendations for
improving program effectiveness. Unlike industry, the
Government perspective consisted of a wide range of views on
how public/private competition should be executed, and what
steps should be taken to enhance the program.
The Government recommendations listed in Chapter IV, and
industry's from Chapter III were evaluated in the last chapter
against criteria designed to test their survivability in an
era of declining defense expenditures and considerable debate
concerning the Defense Industrial Base. A final, yet no less
important, evaluation criterion was political reality. If a
recommendation was certain to challenge political positions,
it was unlikely survive. The remainder of this chapter, the
researcher's conclusions and recommendations will address
question five.
C. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Public/private competition began as a program to force
depot activities like the NADEPs to compete with the private
sector to achieve greater efficiencies. The program began in
the mid to late eighties when defense spending was decreasing
following an incredible build-up which occurred during the
Reagan Administration. One approach to reducing overhaul and
maintenance costs would be to utilize the market forces of
competition to cause depot activities to improve processes,
eliminate unnecessary and redundant operations, and streamline
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management. Initial program successes in the form of cost
savings led Congress to expand the program. In the case of
NAVAIR, and even more so in the case of the Air Force, neither
was prepared to execute public/private competition. Neither
had a strategy or a plan, much less procedures, on how to
proceed. NAVAIR responded quickly, and implemented most of
the various audit, review, and report recommendations which
had been critical of their program's execution. The
initiative and ingenious creativity of personnel at NAVAIR
Headquarters, NADOC, and the NADEPs themselves, allowed NAVAIR
to shape a competitive program which attempted to satisfy
growing industry concerns and the concerns of their NADEPs.
As time went on, and events such as the end of the Cold
War, further Defense reductions, and the call for a greater
"peace dividend", signaled the end of multiple major aircraft
procurements. The OEMs began to increasingly eye maintenance
and overhaul work as potential sources of Defense dollars to
replace lost production. As private industry evaluated the
competition, many believed that public depots had structural
advantages which the Cost Comparability Handbook and
individual Service procedures could not eliminate. Others in
industry believed that all depot work should be transferred to
the private sector, citing a declining industrial base.
The Service's views were diametrically opposed. The Air
Force seemed to be interested in maintaining and even
enlarging its organic capability without regard for the
93
industrial base. NAVAIR's position, the most favored by
industry, represented a balance between Service needs and
industrial base considerations. After reading and hearing
convincing arguments supporting the Air Force view, it is the
opinion of the researcher that that view does not represent
the best interest of the industrial base or of Naval Aviation.
The Naval Aviation Depot Industrial Strategy recognizes
the needs of the Navy to retain control over a fixed number of
aircraft and weapon systems for purposes of maintaining
personnel training, equipment, and facilities to support
readiness requirements. Under the Air Force plan, all
workload would be competed. The Navy could lose the work it
needs to ensure that skills are maintained, and equipment and
facilities available if needed.
The strategy also considers industry, by declaring that
all workload, except identified core, would be available for
private/private competition. The shortcoming of the NAVAIR
strategy becomes obvious here. As long as the Air Force is
permitted by legislation to aggressively seek out additional
workloads, no competitions can be private/private. And, as
long as private activities must compete against public
activities, issues of fairness and cost comparability will
have to be resolved.
Related to the idea of public/private/public competition
is the notion of who is responsible for administration of the
award. What policies or procedures would be followed? If an
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Air Force activity wins a NAVAIR competition, should NAVAIR or
the Air Force administer the award. Who will resolve
disputes? The complexity of modern public/private
competitions requires that a set of standard procedures be
formulated and implemented, which not only facilitates the
contracting process but also legitimatizes the process by
maintaining a level playing field for industry as well as for
competing Services.
The most expeditious way to achieve this objective is
through an expansion of the proposed draft DFARS rule
currently being considered. Such a recommendation would
certainly meet resistance from Air Force representatives, and
possibly from members of the Depot Caucus.
Although an expanded DFARS rule would require immediate
implementation of a standard set of procedures, it would not
address the more fundamental problem of public\private
competition- -the need for a DoD Industrial Base strategy which
specifically address public/private competition. Such a
strategy should be the product of the DoD Joint
Industry/Government Task Force detailed in Chapters IV and V.
Without a DoD-wide strategy followed by implementing
regulations, it is likely that the Defense Department and
industry will miss an important opportunity to fashion a
portion of the industrial base that meets Service




Public versus private competition is a dynamic issue which
is undergoing continuous change. This Thesis began with a
very narrow view of public/private competition applied to the
Naval Aviation Depots. As research progressed and situations
changed; it became more difficult to distinguish
public/private within the NADEPs from public/private/public
which occured during the F-18 MCAPP and is likely to continue
to occur. The need for a Defense Department Depot Industrial
Strategy is an absolute, no matter whether the strategy is
implemented via a DFARS rule, an empowered DDMC or a new Depot
Agency.
This Thesis has also identified other areas for further
research. These include: Public/public competition, a
comparison of public/private competition between NAVAIR and
the Naval Sea Systems Command, and disputes resolution in
public/public competition.
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APPENDIX A. NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY
(13 APRIL 1993)
OBJECTIVE:
To present a naval aviation industrial strategy that: (1)
maintains the minimum organic depot capacity necessary to sustain
the Navy's war fighting capability and (2) makes maximum use of the
capabilities and capacity of the commercial aerospace industry for
aviation depot maintenance.
BACKGROUND:
As a result of reduced defense requirements in the post-cold war
environment, the public and private sectors must respond to rapidly
declining defense spending. That excess capacity, which exists in
both sectors, is manifest by defense base closures and industry
rightsizing. Infrastructure reorganizations planned and ongoing
present an opportunity to develop an industrial base strategy that
capitalizes on the unique capabilities of government and commercial
facilities while reducing total costs to the taxpayer.
STRATEGY:
The Navy's strategy in the downsizing environment is to maintain
only the minimum level of organic capacity, consistent with future
force levels, that is necessary to sustain peacetime readiness and
war fighting surge capability. The Navy will work in partnership
with the commercial aerospace industry to make maximum use of
industry's production capabilities and capacity for aviation depot
level maintenance. This strategy will enable the Navy to help
preserve the private sector industrial base without compromising
its responsibility to maintain a ready and responsive organic
capability.
Specifically, the Navy's strategy is to:
(1) define minimum core requirements (capabilities,
capacity, and work load) necessary to maintain fleet
readiness throughout the life cycle. This core work will
not be offered to industry.
(2) close excess depots as expeditiously as possible,
consistent with BRAC-93 guidelines.
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(3) rightsize the remaining depots to perform core
related work. Investment strategies for military
construction, base improvements, and equipment will
support core work and will not duplicate capabilities and
capacity a-railable in the private sector.
(4) offer non-core work to industry for competition.
Navy depots will not normally compete against private
industry, unless there are insufficient commercial
competitors.
- Navy will ensure a fair and equitable source
selection process.
- Determination will be made on a best value basis.
- Navy depots will not participate in source selection
processes.
(5) develop commercial contract performance guidelines
that specify readiness requirements.
(6) develop a long-range plan which identifies Navy core
work, and work that will be available for industry,
allowing both industry and government to make long-term
strategic decisions.
(7) -transition to this industrial strategy concurrent
with execution of base closure and realignment decisions.
SUMMARY:
It is in the best interest of the Navy, commercial aerospace
industry, and taxpayers that military readiness be maintained at
minimum cost. The Navy and industry will work in partnership to
establish efficient business practices; benchmark the most cost
effective ones; and implement the best practices. Unnecessary
duplication of equipment and capability, and excess facilities,
will be eliminated. A long-range strategy for the allocation of
work to the public and private sectors, which reduces the risk of
investment, will be developed. Public versus private competition
will be minimized as both sectors specialize, thereby encouraging
increased private sector participation.
The Navy's strategy will:
(1) result in an effective maintenance capability that
meets the readiness requirements of the fleet;
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(2) place a greater reliance for depot maintenance on
private industry, utilizing imbedded capability and
capacity;
(3) be a consistent policy, allowing the Navy and
industry to plan for the future; and
(4) be the model government-industry relationship,
accomplishing the goals of both while serving the best
interest of the nation.
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APPENDIX B
SUBPART 217.78--CONPZTI'IIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC ACTIVITIES AND
PRIVATh SECTOR FIRMS
217.7800 Scope of subpart.
This subpart implements Section 8072 of the Defense
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Pub L. 101-5110, similar
sectiors in subsequent Defense appropriations acts, and Section
353 of che Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (Pub L.
102-484). These laws permit DoD to acquire the modification,
depot maintenance and repair of aircraft, vehicles and vessels
through competition between public activities and private
entities. This subpart provides policies and procedures for
conducting competitive acquisitions between public activities and
private entities.
217.7801 Definitions.
As used in this subpart--
(a) "Private entity," "public activity" and "workload
assignment" are defined in the provision at 252.217-
7029, Explanation of the Competition.
(b) "Public-private competition" means the process used to
select a source for a DoD requirement that has been
identified in accordance with DoD Instruction 4151.18,
Procedures for Maintenance of Military Materiel, and is
listed on the annual list of known requirements that
will be offered for competition between public
activities and private entities.
217.7802 Policy.
(a) Public-private competitions shall be conducted in
accordance with the procedures of this subpart.
(b) Public-private competitions are not subject to the
requirements of OMB Circular A-76.
(c) Individuals, including advisors and management, who
personally and substantially participate in the
preparation of the statement of work, purchase request,
solicitation document, technical evaluation, cost
comparisons or award document, shall not participate in





(a) The Commerce Business Daily synopsis shall state that
offers are being solicited from both public activities
and private entities and that the solicitation will not
result in a contract to a private entity if the
Government's offer is determined to be more
advantageous.
(b) If the contracting officer determines the requirements
for setting aside the acquisition for small business
exist (see FAR 19.502), the synopsis shall state that
competition shall be limited to public activities and
small businesses.
217.7803-2 Proposal evaluation.
(a) Proposals received in response to public-private
solicitations shall be evaluated in accordance with FAR
15.805, except that a cost comparability evaluation
shall be performed in accordance with the Defense Depot
Maintenance Council's Cost Comparability Handbook. The
evaluation focuses on several adjustment factors used
to compare, as equitably as possible, a public activity
proposal with a private entity proposal. The
contracting officer shall determine application of the
cost comparability factors consistent with the
requirements of the solicitation.
(b) Proposals submitted by public activities shall be
evaluated for cost realism as defined in 215.801.
Proposals submitted by private entities should be
evaluated for cost realism in accordance with 215.805-
70.
(c) The defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) will provide
audits of public activity proposals, regardless of
dollar amount. When requiring such audits, contracting
officers shall:
(1) Reference Section 9095 of the Fiscal Year 1993
Defense Appropriations Act in the request: and
(2) Provide a copy of the request to the Department of
Defense, Office of the Comptroller, Attention: CA&A,
Room 3E825, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1100.
(d) Upon completion of the evaluation process, the
responsible agency official shall make the final
determination for performance by a public activity or a
private entity and shall provide written notification
to the contracting officer, who shall either award a




Section 9095 of Pub. L. 102-396 requires DCAA to certify cost
comparability of public and private offers received in response
to public-private solicitations. Agencies shall ensure that the
required cost comparability certification is obtained before
award of a contract or workload assignment.
217.7803-4 Contractor use of Government supply sources.
If it is in the Government's interest, and if required supplies
are available from Government supply sources, contracting
officers should authorize contractors to use these sources in
accordance with FAR Subpart 51.1, in performing contracts
resulting from public-private competition.
217.7803-5 Solicitation provisions and contract clauses.
Use the following provisions in solicitations involving public-
private competition:
(1) 252.217-7029, Explanation of the Competition; and
(2) 252.217-7030, Cost Comparability Adjustments.
SUBPART 252.2-TEXTS OF PROVISIONS AND CLAUSES
252.217-7029 Explanation of the Competition.
As prescribed in 217.7803-5(a) (1), use the following provision:
EXPLANATION OF THE COMPETITION (DATE)
(a) Definitions.
(1) "Private entity" means a nongovernmental source.
(2) "Public activity" means a Department of Defense (DoD)
activity engaged in the modification, depot maintenance
and repair of aircraft, vehicles and vessels.
(3) "Workload assignment" means a requirement assigned to a
public activity as the result of a public-private
competition.
(b) The Government is conducting this competition as authorized
by Section 8072 of the Fiscal Year 1991 Defense Appropriations
Act (Pub. L. 101-511) and similar sections in subsequent Defense
appropriations acts. These laws permit DoD to acquire the
modification, depot maintenance and repair of aircraft, vehicles
and vessels through competition between public activities and
private entities.
(c) Section 9095 of the Fiscal Year 1993 Defense Appropriations
Act (Pub. L. 102-396) requires the Defense Contract Audit Agency
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(DCAA) to certify cost comparability of public and private
offers. DCAA will perform the required cost comparability
certification before contract award or workload assignment
resulting from this competition.
(d) As part of the evaluation, the Government will analyze
public activity offers to determine whether the proposal reflects
a realistic estimate of the total cost required to satisfy the
work requirement.
(End of provision)
252.217-7030 Cost Comparability Adjustments.
as prescribed in 217.7805-5(a)(2), use the following provision:
COST COMPARABILITY ADJUSTMENTS (DATE)
(a) The Comparability Bid/Proposal Worksheet found in the
Defense Depot Maintenance Council's Cost Comparability Hardbook
will be used to adjust proposals. The required adjustments are
intended to provide for an equitable comparison between
Government activities and private entities.
(b) The Cost Comparability Handbook was developed by the Defense
Depot Maintenance Council Cost Comparability Committee. Its
purpose is to provide guidance for adjustments to Government
accounting procedures to ensure that the Government offer
captures the cost of doing business on an equivalent basis with
private industry. The contracting officer will provide a copy of
the Cost Comparability Handbook to interested parties upon
request. The Cost Comparability Handbook in effect on the date
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